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Globalization is a phenomenon of great worldwide interests. Owing to advancement
in production technology and lower transportation and communication cost,
fragmenting and contracting out production processes has spilled over into
international arena with outsourcing of numerous material components and service
activities. With a significant increase in the degree of internationalization,
‘outsourcing’ for the time being is loosely coined. It is therefore clearly difficult to
understand the explicit impacts of outsourcing in the economy. In this thesis, both
theoretical and empirical frameworks aiming to analyze the economic impacts of this
ongoing phenomenon have been developed.
In Chapter I, the starting point is to generalize the successive monopoly model
by incorporating the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations vis-à-vis the
Generalized Nash Bargaining. Under downstream unionization, a firm may find
vertical integration profitable if her relative bargaining power with the labor union is
sufficiently high, compared with that with the upstream firm. Given the basic
framework, I introduce the foreign downstream firm, who outsources key
intermediate inputs from the domestic downstream firm, thereby triggering
competition in the downstream market. I show that a firm may strategically exercise
vertical foreclosure by merger if her relative bargaining power with both labor union
and domestic upstream firm is sufficiently high.
Chapter II attempts to investigate the linkages among outsourcing activities,
labor productivity, and wage inequality for skilled and unskilled labor by employing a
primal approach that involves estimating a nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function, using the data of six-digit North American Industry
vi
Classification System (NAICS) US manufacturing industries from 2002 to 2005. First,
I find that the skill-biased impact of general outsourcing on labor productivity is
larger than that of international outsourcing. Second, the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled labor, which is defined as their marginal productivity gap, can be better
explained by general outsourcing than by international outsourcing. These two results
imply that the wage inequality of US manufacturing industries during 2002-2005 was
mainly due to the skill-biased labor productivity effect of general outsourcing rather
than that of international outsourcing.
Existing studies on the impact of outsourcing activities on relative wages and
the demand for skilled workers mainly focus on aggregate outsourcing activities, in
which imported intermediate inputs are used as a proxy. Chapter III departs from the
existing studies by focusing on various types of outsourcing and on the manufacturing
sector at a lower aggregation level. The main finding is that downstream materials and
service outsourcing are skill-biased whereas upstream materials outsourcing is not
With increasing emphasis on the importance of outsourcing, the ‘fear of job
losses’ has been of public interests, not only in developed countries, but also in
developing countries. In Chapter IV, I empirically investigate the impacts of material
and service outsourcing on the relative demands for skilled and unskilled labor in the
Thailand’s manufacturing sector from 1999 to 2003 by using firm-level data. I find
that material outsourcing and service outsourcing are both skill-biased. Furthermore, I
extend the analysis to capture the impacts of outsourcing on labor substitution as
measured by the Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution.
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1CHAPTER I
VERTICAL INTEGRATION, FOREIGN OUTSOURCING,
AND UPSTREAM FORECLOSURE
1.1 Introduction
The first chapter is concerned with strategic incentives for vertical integration. A
traditional issue has long emphasized on how the presence of market power in
vertically related firms sheds light on the motives for vertical integration. It is well
established that the disintegrated firms always have an incentive to be vertically
integrated due to the externality resulting from double marginalization (Spengler,
1950). 1 In other words, under the successive non-competitive structure, since
upstream and downstream firms are independently engaged in non-competitive
pricing, the fact that they carry merely their individual profits for the pricing entails a
failure to take into account the impacts of overall firm’s profit. As is well known, this
vertical externality (Tirole, 1988) would be dissipated by vertical integration
(Greenhut and Ohta, 1979, Waterson, 1982, and Lin, 1988, among others).
I abstract from the conventional successive monopoly model in two respects.
Firstly, I introduce the inter-firm negotiation of successive monopoly, i.e., the
bargaining between the upstream and downstream firms. 2 In contrast with the
literature which mostly focuses on the extreme case where the material price can be
unilaterally set by either upstream (Zhao, 2001) or downstream (parent) firms (Chen,
1 The literature on double marginalization under the successive monopoly structure provides another
rationalization of vertical integration incentives and is therefore complementary with the literature that
clarifies the role of transaction costs, asset specificity, and incomplete contracts which affect the firms’
decision whether to undertake the activities in-house (vertical integration) or to afford them from
outside. The studies of this bilateral relationship have been pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986)
among others.
2 Successive monopoly in the conventional context is the extreme case of my framework. Specifically,
the successive monopoly is the case where the upstream firm has perfect negotiation power over the
downstream firm, thereby enabling her to charge the monopoly price. By introducing inter-firm
bargaining, the transfer price of intermediate inputs is assumed to be determined via the Generalized
Nash Bargaining.
2et al., 2004 and Hyde and Choe, 2005 among others), the inter-firm bargaining of the
transfer price between upstream and downstream firms is the norm, rather than the
exception, from the viewpoint of real business practices (Vaysman, 1998). Moreover,
in line with the inter-firm bargaining, I generalize the labor-management negotiation
by taking into account negotiation power between the downstream firm and the labor
union. Although my generalization may not qualitatively change the existing, well-
known results, it may be appealing to formulate the framework in a more generalized
fashion, which in turn may yield us clearer insights into the optimal organizational
choices under the presence of inter-firm and labor-management negotiations.
In this chapter, I model the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations
based on the Generalized Nash Bargaining. It is also worthwhile to highlight that
another alternative bargaining model could be the Rubinstein’s alternating-offers
model. It is well established that as the offers are made in the continuous time fashion,
the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium payoff pair in the Rubinstein’s model
converges to the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution. This may provide the
justification of the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution in that its bargaining
outcome generated is equivalent to the limiting bargaining outcome under
Rubinstein’s model (see Muthoo, 1999, pp. 65-69 for more detailed discussions).
Furthermore, the relative bargaining powers in the Generalized Nash Bargaining can
be interpreted as the players’ discount rates in the Rubinstein’s alternating-offers
model.
In contrast with the conventional literature without unionization, in which it is
always profitable for a disintegrated firm to be vertically integrated, and the model
with downstream unionization where such vertical integration incentives may not
exist, I show that, despite the presence of unionization, the vertical integration
3incentives may still prevail if the relative bargaining position of the downstream firm
in the labor-management negotiation is relatively high, compared with that in the
inter-firm bargaining. I also reveal that if the labor-management and inter-firm
negotiations can be undertaken simultaneously, rather than sequentially, the vertical
integration motives are declined. Furthermore, I complete the analysis of timing
structures of negotiations by arguing that if the disintegrated firm can strategically
choose the negotiation agendas, she will never find the labor-management bargaining
prior to the inter-firm bargaining optimal. Given these results, my generalization may
provide a clearer insight into the roles of the labor-management and inter-firm
negotiations on the vertical integration motives.
Besides the merger incentives under the monopolized downstream market, one
of the central debates has to do with the anti-competitive aspects of vertical
integration. For instance, in face of competition in the downstream market, the
integrated firm may foreclose her rivals’ access to the supply of intermediate inputs.
Hence, upstream foreclosure brings about monopoly rent in the downstream market.
The notion of upstream foreclosure is defined as the extent to which a downstream
firm is excluded from the access to the upstream supplier (Stefanadis, 1997). The
standard foreclosure theory suggests that vertical foreclosure may characterize the
equilibrium as it provides them monopoly power and raises rivals’ cost (Salinger,
1988 and Ordover, et al., 1990). 3 A clear example can be seen from the merger
between a broadband internet service provider, AOL, and its internet content supplier,
Time Warner. The AOL Time Warner can do away with its rivals’ access to internet
contents and services by exercising the conduit discrimination (Rubinfeld and Singer,
3 The crucial assumption in the standard foreclosure theory as in Salinger (1988) is that vertically
integrated firms will neither buy nor sell in intermediate input markets. In the case of the upstream
foreclosure and the homogenous product as in the present chapter, it implies that, with a tight
relationship under vertical integration, the upstream firm can make a credible commitment to the
downstream firm to supply the key inputs only internally.
42001), thereby improving its monopoly power in broadband internet industries.4 This
gives rise to the antitrust issue in the context of domestic and international
competition.
To theoretically investigate how anti-competitive effects of upstream
foreclosure affect incentives for vertical integration, I develop the benchmark model
of the disintegrated structure by introducing downstream competition in which a
foreign downstream firm outsources key intermediate inputs by purchasing them from
the domestic upstream firm, thereby changing the final output market structure from
monopoly to Cournot competition.5 Hence, the upstream firm will bargain over the
intermediate input price with not only the domestic downstream firm, but also the
foreign outsourcer. This chapter contributes to the standard foreclosure theory by
emphasizing the roles of the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations, which
account for the possibilities that upstream foreclosure, though anti-competitive, is not
always profitable in that, although the downstream firm’s profits will certainly
increase due to higher market power, the refusal to supply intermediate inputs to a
foreign outsourcer will undermine the upstream firm’s profits. My result reveals that
the domestic firm may not have a motive to exclude a foreign downstream firm from
the access to intermediate inputs if the downstream firm’s relative bargaining
positions with the labor union and with the upstream firm are both sufficiently low.
Therefore, the upstream foreclosure may not be profitable, depending on two
tradeoffs: monopoly rent gains versus upstream losses and vertical externality
4 Alternatively, AOL Time Warner can also exercise content discrimination in order to insulate its firm
from competition by worsening or banning the contents and services of outsiders. In this sense, the
content discrimination may be classified as downstream foreclosure.
5 I assume that the final outputs are homogenous, and therefore the final output market is characterized
by Cournot competition. However, it is straightforward to extend my model to account for
differentiated products and therefore Bertrand competition.
5elimination gains versus losses of surpluses extracted by the labor union.6 These may
explain the counterexample of AOL Time Warner, for which some firms, especially
in automotive and high-tech industries, supply their intermediate materials and
technologies to their rivals, thereby entailing competitive effects in the final output
market. For instance, Toyota Motors supplies her engines to Chinese car
manufacturers; IBM provides a Chinese computer manufacturer, Lenovo, the
technologies for laptop production; and some Taiwanese computer manufacturers,
such as Acer, also use the processors supplied by Apple.
The organization of this chapter can be outlined as follows. In Section 1.2, I
will briefly elaborate the overview of the literature, which are relevant to my analyses.
In Section 1.3, I formulate the basic model in which a monopoly is disintegrated into
two vertically linked firms: non-unionized upstream and unionized downstream firms.
Then, the vertically integrated structure will be considered and compared with the
disintegrated structure to reveal the conditions under which the vertical integration
incentives exist. Section 1.4 discusses the strategic use of bargaining agendas. In
Section 1.5, the foreign outsourcer will be introduced. After solving the equilibrium
with the foreign downstream rival, I obtain the conditions under which the firms will
strategically exercise upstream foreclosure. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Overview of the Related Literature
The motives for vertical integration have long been examined in the literature. Among
others, the incentives for a disintegrated firm to merge could be explained by double
marginalization, firstly introduced by Spengler (1950). As is well known, “…the
6 Since my focus is on obtaining the condition under which upstream foreclosure may or may not be
profitable under the presence of the labor-management and inter-firm bargaining, rather than the
commitment problem (Reiffen, 1992), I assume the standard foreclosure assumption (Salinger, 1988)
that the upstream firm under the integrated structure credibly commits to exclusively supplying
intermediate inputs to the downstream firm.
6objective of vertical integration is to avoid the double price distortion that occurs
when each firm adds its own price-cost margin at each stage of production…” (Tirole,
1988, Chapter 4, p. 175). A number of literatures have subsequently examined several
models of successive non-competitive industries. For instance, Greenhut and Ohta
(1979), Waterson (1982), and Lin (1988) assume homogenous products and hence
Cournot competition in the final output markets. Hart and Tirole (1990) consider the
models characterized by differentiated products and Bertrand competition.
Zhao (2001) extends the mainstream vertical integration theory by introducing
a unionized downstream industry. In the model with successive monopoly in which
the wage and employment are determined via the labor-management negotiation
based on the Nash bargaining, vertical integration motives may disappear as the gains
from the elimination of vertical externality are extracted by the labor union. Thus, the
labor union will be better-off under vertical integration in terms of both higher wage
and employment, whereas the non-integrated industries will not. Nonetheless, some
important aspects, including the inter-firm bargaining between upstream and
downstream firms and the role of its interaction with the labor-management
negotiation, have not been sufficiently emphasized. Though introducing those aspects
into the model does not change the well-known results, it should yield us clearer
insights into vertical integration incentives and other interesting results regarding the
roles of the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations.
Apart from a vertical integration motive under the non-competitive market, I
extend the model by introducing a foreign downstream firm that chooses to outsource
key intermediate inputs from a domestic upstream firm and compete in the same
market as the domestic downstream firm. It should be highlighted that my focus is on
how the anti-competitive strategies against a foreign outsourcer, so called upstream
7foreclosure, change the vertical integration incentives. That is, given the presence of a
foreign outsourcer, a domestic firm may or may not have an incentive to exercise
upstream foreclosure by ceasing the foreign downstream firm’s access to procuring
the intermediate materials from the upstream firm.
Indeed, the notion of vertical foreclosure is not new. The well established
results that the firms with production advantages, probably in terms of production
efficiency, cost advantages, key resources, and economies of scale, can obtain higher
monopoly rent by vertically foreclosing the competition from their rivals as it would
increase their competitors’ cost, have been shown by a number of literatures, such as
Aghion and Bolton (1987), Salinger (1988), and Ordover, et al. (1990). Hart and
Tirole (1990) examine the model in which both upstream and downstream
foreclosures are implemented in order to monopolize both upstream and downstream
markets. By incorporating dynamic economies of scale in the upstream industry and
the R&D competition, Stefanadis (1997) analyzes the welfare impacts of downstream
foreclosure in terms of a captive buyer.7 He shows that the downstream foreclosure
deters R&D investment and entails an adverse impact on consumers’ welfare. In
contrast, Chipty (2001) finds that vertical integration in the cable television industry is
associated with vertical foreclosure and entails consumers’ welfare gains due to
increased efficiency.
Apart from the literature concerned with the competitive and welfare effects of
vertical foreclosure, several literatures have examined the condition under which
vertical foreclosure is profitable. Higgins (1999) generalizes Salinger’s (1988) model
by dropping the assumption that the vertically integrated firms do not serve the
intermediate input market and shows that vertical foreclosure is not generally
7 According to Stefanadis (1997), the captivity refers to the extent to which the downstream buyers are
prohibited from purchasing intermediate inputs from other suppliers even though they offer cheaper
prices.
8profitable, depending on the number of intermediate and final good producers. Choi
and Yi (2000) show that there exists a threshold of the correlation coefficient between
randomized costs of two upstream firms above which the equilibria are characterized
by vertical foreclosure. Their notion of vertical foreclosure differs from the standard
definition in the sense that a firm is assumed to foreclose a rival by exclusively
supplying specialized intermediate inputs, as opposed to producing general inputs and
therefore serving all downstream firms. Based on this notion, vertical foreclosure is in
principle plausible in both integrated and disintegrated structures.8 In contrast with
Choi and Yi, I reveal the range of downstream firm’s parameters of bargaining power
with the labor union and the upstream firm in which a firm will find upstream
foreclosure profitable. To the best of my knowledge, the roles of the labor-
management and inter-firm bargaining in determining the firm’s foreclosure decisions
have not been examined in the context of the standard foreclosure theory.
Accordingly, the first chapter contributes to the literature on vertical
integration and vertical foreclosure theories in the following ways. Firstly, I
emphasize the interaction between the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations
as determinants of the optimal organizational structures. I show that a firm may still
have an incentive to be vertically integrated if her relative bargaining position in the
labor-management bargaining is sufficiently better than that in inter-firm bargaining.
Secondly, I show that timing of negotiations or bargaining agendas matter. If both
negotiations can be undertaken simultaneously, the vertical integration incentives may
deteriorate, and it would never be in the firms’ interests to undertake the labor-
management prior to inter-firm negotiations. Last but not least, I am the first, to the
best of my knowledge, to highlight the interaction between both negotiations, which
8 However, Choi and Yi (2000) confine their attention merely to the range of correlation coefficient
parameters in which there is no foreclosure incentive under the non-integrated structure, which is
therefore equivalent to assuming that vertical integration may or may not entail vertical foreclosure.
9affects the profitability of vertical foreclosure. If the downstream firm’s bargaining
positions in both negotiations are sufficiently low, it may not be appealing for the
domestic firm to foreclose the foreign downstream firm’s access to the key
intermediate inputs.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Vertical Disintegration under Unionization
Consider two vertically related firms, namely, upstream and downstream firms. The
production of final output, q, requires one unit of labor and intermediate materials,
which are perfect complements. The upstream firm produces intermediate materials
and is a sole supplier to the downstream one. I assume that materials can be produced
with marginal cost c and sold to the downstream firm with price m. As such, the
upstream firm’s profit function is characterized by
 qcmm  . (1)
The downstream industry is unionized, and the downstream firm is a
monopoly in the final output market. As such, her main tasks are to employ
intermediate materials and labor to produce and market final outputs. Therefore, her
profit function can be shown as
  ,)( qwmqpDI  (2)
where )(qp is an inversed demand function satisfying the standard assumptions,
i.e., 0)(  qp and 0)(2)(  qpqp ,9 and w is the negotiated wage paid to a domestic
labor union. I follow the standard right-to-manage approach to the wage
determination under which the downstream firm bargains over the wage with a labor
9 The inversed demand that satisfies this assumption must not be too convex.
10
union given the expected employment decisions by the former.10 I assume that the
labor union’s objective function takes the following functional form.
owqLwqqwU )(),(  , (3)
where L denotes the number of union members, and ow represents the rate of
unemployment benefits. Essentially, the union preference (3) constitutes the total
income earned by its members, and in the case of agreement breakdown its utility will
eventually be Lwo . As such, the union’s surplus entering the labor-management
bargaining problem is qwwLwqwU oo )(),(  . One may associate this
specification with the Stone-Geary type utility function in which the disagreement
point is normalized to zero, and the union is neutral with respect to the wage and
employment. This type of a utility function is commonly used in the literature (see
Pemberton, 1988).11
Based on this disintegrated structure, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
of the material price, wage, and employment is determined in three stages. In the first
stage, the upstream and downstream firms negotiate over material price (m). Then, in
the second stage, given the bargained material price, the downstream firm bargains
the wage rate (w) with the union. In the final stage, the downstream firm combines
materials and labor to produce final output q and sell it in the domestic market. At the
end of this three-stage game, the consolidated profit and union’s welfare are realized.
My timing structure goes along with the notion of long-term mode decisions. In
particular, the negotiated material prices are irrevocable at the time of the wage
negotiation. This seems plausible if the establishment of the vertically linked structure
10 My crucial results remain qualitatively unchanged even though the downstream firm and labor union
negotiate over both wage and employment or only employment.
11 The Stone-Geary utility function takes the following form:   1)(),( qwwqwU o , where
10  . The union is said to be wage (employment)-oriented if 5.0)( and neutral if 5.0 .
11
requires a long-term relationship. However, in principle it is also possible to assume
that the wage is negotiated at the same time as or prior to the material price. I will
account for the former in Sub-section 1.3.4 and briefly discuss the latter in Section 1.4.
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium can be solved by using the standard
backward induction procedure. In the final stage, the downstream firm decides on the
optimal amount of final outputs as well as labor and intermediate materials employed
to maximize her individual profits.
  qmwqpmwq
q
DI  )(maxarg),( , (4)
where the subscript DI denotes the downstream firm under the vertical disintegration
structure. Given the negotiated wage and intermediate material prices, the profit-
maximizing production must satisfy the first- and second-order conditions.
FOC mwqpqqp  )()( (5A)
SOC 0)()(2  qpqqp (5B)
The standard assumptions on demands introduced earlier imply that both necessary
and sufficient conditions associated with the maximization problem (4) are trivially
satisfied.
By using (5A-B), and Implicit Function Theorem, it follows that
  0)()(2 1  qpqqpmqwq . (6)
PROPOSITION 1 Given the standard assumptions on demands, the optimal decision
on final output production is strictly decreasing in the negotiated wage and material
price.
This result is not surprising, however. Increases in either the wage or material price
will result in higher cost of production and thus lower demands for both labor and
material inputs. This exercise tells us that the upstream firm and the labor union,
12
given a decreasing and not too convex demand for final outputs, also face downward-
sloping demands for intermediate materials and labor.
In order to characterize the solutions, I impose an additional assumption on the
functional form of the inversed demand for the final output. Without losses of
generality, I assume that the demand is linear and have the following
form: bqaqp )( , and the demand for final output is sufficiently high such that
0q in the equilibrium. By substituting this linear demand into (5A), I can easily

























Next, I proceed to the second stage of the labor-management negotiation in
which the intermediate material price is still treated as exogenously given. To account
for the asymmetries of players, I assume that the wage negotiation between the
downstream firm and the labor union follows the Generalized Nash Bargaining. If the
agreement breaks down, the disagreement point for the downstream firm is
normalized to zero whereas that for the labor union is equal to Lwo . Intuitively, since
labor cannot be substituted by other inputs, the breakdown implies that the demands
for labor and intermediate materials, as well as downstream firm’s payoffs, are zero
while each union member just receives the unemployment benefit, ow . Based on the
Generalized Nash Bargaining, the negotiated wage is determined by solving the
following problem.12
12 Muthoo (1999) shows that a bargaining solution to (8) is the Nash Bargaining solution if and only if
it satisfies the following axioms: Invariance to Equivalent Utility Representations, Pareto Efficiency,
13








where  1,0 denotes the relative negotiation power of the downstream firm with
respect to the labor union. By differentiating (8) with respect to w, the first-order























For the sake of further analyses, rather than developing discussions in a generalized
way, I shall derive the results based on the linear demand assumed earlier. As such,









After simple manipulations, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for the wage
rate associated with (8) can be portrayed as follows.
ooDI wwmaAmw  ))(()(  , (11)
where 2)1()(  A . Since  1,0 , it is straightforward to show
that 0))(( 0  wmaAw  , and 0)(  Amw .
PROPOSITION 2 Given the linear demand, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
for the wage premium ( oDI wmw )( ) is decreasing in downstream firm’s negotiation
power with both labor union and intermediate material price.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. The higher downstream
firm’s negotiation power implies that the total surplus is allocated more from the labor
union to the downstream firm. Since the surplus realized by the downstream firm is
decreasing in the wage paid to the labor union, the Nash bargaining solution to the
Symmetry, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Since it can be shown that the solution to (8)
satisfies those axioms, it is the Nash Bargaining solution.
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wage rate must be lowered. Moreover, the higher intermediate material price reduces
the downstream firm’s surpluses to be shared with the labor union in the labor-
management negotiation and therefore decreases the equilibrium wage rate.
Next, I plug in the equilibrium wage rate (11) into the equilibrium final output









Am  . (12)
Analogous to the wage rate determination, the material price is also
determined via the Generalized Nash Bargaining between the downstream and
upstream firms, inter-firm bargaining henceforth. The asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution for the intermediate material price can be derived by solving the following
optimization problem.







































where  1,0 is the relative negotiation power of the downstream firm with respect
to the upstream one. It should be noticed that in the inter-firm bargaining the
disagreement points of both downstream and upstream firms are normalized to zero in
that if the agreement breaks down, there is no production, and therefore neither labor
nor material inputs will be purchased.
By differentiating (13) with respect to m and after some simple manipulations,









It can also be easily seen from (14) that the second-order condition is satisfied.
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By manipulating (14), the Nash bargaining solution for the intermediate
material price can be written as
cwcaBm o  ))(( , (15)
where 2)1()(  B .
From (13), 0))((  owcaBm  and 0 m .
PROPOSITION 3 Given the linear demand and sequential bargaining structure, the
Nash bargaining solution for the intermediate material price is decreasing in
downstream firm’s relative negotiation power with respect to the upstream firm but
independent of that with respect to the labor union.
The intuition of the first part of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 2
in that the higher downstream firm’s negotiation power suggests that the Nash
bargaining solution will be in favor of her. Interestingly, one may observe that the
downstream firm’s relative bargaining power with respect to the labor union ( ) does
not enter the first-order condition (14). 13 This can be explained by the fact that the
decisions of material purchases are assumed to require relatively long-term
commitments compared with the labor-management decision, and the inter-firm
negotiation will be undertaken in the expectation of the wage negotiated in the
subsequent period. In other words, it takes place in face of the knowledge that some
surpluses will be extracted by the union only in next period. Therefore, the
downstream firm’s relative bargaining position with the labor union will not affect the
outcome of the negotiated material price.
By using (15), the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the wage rate,
production, the union’s welfare, and the consolidated profits can be portrayed as
13 This argument no longer holds if the downstream firm copes with foreign outsourcing firms. I will
extend my basic structure by incorporating this later.
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ooDI wwcaBAw  ))(1(
bwcaBAq oDI 2)()1)(1( 





















By combining Proposition 2, Proposition 3 implies that 0))((   mmww .
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the wage is decreasing in the downstream
firm’s relative bargaining power with the labor union ( ) and increasing in that with
the upstream firm (  ).14 The former relationship is obvious as higher bargaining
power with the labor union enables the downstream firm to lower the negotiated wage.
The latter relationship stems from the fact that the lowered material price obtained
from better bargaining power with the upstream firm will increase the downstream
firm’s surplus shared by the labor union.
1.3.2 Vertical Integration under Unionization
In this sub-section, I consider the case where the downstream and upstream firms are
vertically integrated. In line with the disintegrated organizational structure, vertical
integration is a special case where the downstream firm has a full control over the
upstream firm, and hence she carries the consolidated profits, rather than merely
downstream profits, to bargain with her labor union in the later stage. In other words,
in the first stage the downstream firm bargains with the upstream firm with 1 ,
thereby setting cm  . Then, in the second stage, she negotiates the wage rate with the
labor union so as to maximize her consolidated profits. In the final stage, the
14 It can be easily shown that
0))(1)((  oDI wcaBAw  and 0))(()(  oDI wcaABw  .
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production and employment decisions are made. At the end of this timing structure,
the consolidated profit and union welfare are realized.
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium can be obtained by applying
Backward Induction. In the final stage, the integrated firm has to make a production
decision so as to maximize her consolidated profits, which can be shown as
 qwcqpVI  )( , (17)
where subscript VI refers to the vertically integrated firm. Apparently, the objective
function, as well as the corresponding first- and second-order conditions, is analogous
to (4) – (6) except for the fact that m is replaced by c. As a result, the optimal output,
price, consolidated profit, and union’s welfare, as a function of the given negotiated
























Next, I plug in (18) into the labor-management negotiation. The Generalized Nash
bargaining solution of the wage rate can be formulated in the same way as (8) except
for m replaced by c as before.








Following the same optimization procedure, it is straightforward to show that the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the negotiated wage, production, consolidated profit,
and labor union’s welfare is






















Since  1,0 , and 12)1(0  B , it follows that DIVI UU  .
PROPOSITION 4 The labor union is better-off under the vertical integration compared
with the vertical disintegration.
If the firm is vertically integrated, Proposition 4 shows that the labor union’s
welfare will be improved in terms of both higher negotiated wage rate and
employment. This result is consistent with the well established results that the labor
union will be better-off under vertical integration as she can extract larger surpluses
from the integrated firm. From my generalization, I further show that under
asymmetric bargaining the result holds only when the vertically integrated firm’s
bargaining power is less than perfect ( 1 ).
1.3.3 Organizational Forms Decisions
Does the firm have an incentive to merge? To answer this question, I have to compare
the equilibrium profits under vertical integration with those under vertical
disintegration. From the consolidated profits of vertically related firms (16) and a





























From (22), it is apparent that the vertical integration incentive counts mainly on two
parameters of the firm’s bargaining power,  and  . The range of these two
parameters for which the firm will decide to be vertically integrated can be portrayed
by using the following figure.
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Figure 1.1: Vertical Integration Incentives under Successive Monopoly.
Before developing further discussions, I, based on Figure 1.1, invoke the
following proposition.15
PROPOSITION 5 A downstream firm will (not) have an incentive to merge if the
downstream firm’s relative bargaining power with respect to the labor union ( ) is
sufficiently high (low) compared with that with respect to the upstream firm (  ).
According to Figure 1.1, the downstream firm will decide to merge with the
upstream firm only when her parameters of relative negotiation power,  and  , lie
in the bottom-right area. That is, vertical integration will be profitable only when her
bargaining position in the labor-management negotiation is better than that in the
inter-firm negotiation. Intuitively, the decision of vertical integration can be
rationalized by a tradeoff between the elimination of ‘double marginalization’16 and
losses of surpluses extracted by the labor union. On the contrary, under the
15 Figure 1.1 is drawn by utilizing the Mathematica program package based only on the linear demand
assumption. With linear demand, I do not need to impose any restrictions on parameters.
16 ‘Double marginalization’ in my context slightly differs from the conventional definition in the sense
that I allow for the inter-firm negotiation between the downstream and upstream firms. Based on the
conventional context, the upstream firm is able to charge monopoly prices of materials supplied for the
downstream firm. By introducing inter-firm negotiations, the material price charged by the upstream
firm lies between the monopoly price and her marginal production cost of materials.
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disintegrated structure, the firm gains from the better negotiation position with the
labor union at the expense of lowered consolidated profits as a corollary of vertical
externalities.
Accordingly, if the relative negotiation power with the labor union is
sufficiently high compared with that with the upstream firm, the gains from the
elimination of double marginalization will outweigh the losses of a deteriorated
bargaining position with the labor union, and therefore vertical integration is
profitable. On the other hand, if the downstream firm has a better position of the inter-
firm negotiation relative to the position of the labor-management negotiation, the
losses from merging decisions in terms of the higher negotiated wage may be
sufficiently huge such that she better stays disintegrated.
My results elaborated thus far contribute to the literature on and thus provide a
clearer insight into the relationship between the labor market and organizational
management under non-competitive vertical markets. It is well established that
vertical integration always results in higher consolidated profits of an industry in that
the successive monopoly when the firm is vertically disintegrated entails double
marginalization, which devastates industry profits. Therefore, a firm always has an
incentive to internalize all production activities (see Greenhut and Ohta, 1979 and
Waterson, 1982 among others). With the presence of a labor union, Zhao (2001)
employs the labor-management negotiation based on the Nash bargaining formulation
to show that there are no incentives for vertical integration.17 My generalization
shows that, despite the presence of the labor union, the firm may still have an
17 Zhao (2001) assumes a linear demand and shows that the consolidated profits under vertical
disintegration are equal to the profits under merger. As such, he concludes that there are no incentives
for a firm to be vertically integrated under the existence of a labor-management negotiation. My
calculation can always be collapsed to the Zhao’s case by setting 5.0 and 0 and assuming
that both parties bargain over both wage and employment.
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incentive to merge if the downstream firm’s negotiation power with the labor union is
sufficiently high compared to that with the upstream firm.
1.3.4 Parallel Negotiations
In Sub-section 1.3.1, under the disintegrated organizational structure, I assume that
the inter-firm negotiation between the downstream and upstream firms over the price
of intermediate materials takes place prior to the labor-management negotiation.
Although this timing structure can be rationalized by the extent to which an internal
contract is in general more long-term than the employment commitment, I could not
rule out the possibility that the downstream firm undertakes both negotiations
simultaneously.18 To account for this scenario, the timing structure can be modified
from three-stage to two-stage games as follows. In the first stage, the downstream
firm at the same time bargains over the wage and material price with the labor union
and upstream firm, respectively. Then, given the negotiated wage and transfer
material price, the downstream firm chooses the level of production so as to maximize
her individual profits. At the end of this two-stage game, the consolidated profit and
labor union’s welfare are realized.19
By using the backward induction procedure, the expressions of the profit-
maximizing production, price, downstream firm’s profit, and labor union’s welfare, as
functions of the negotiated wage and transfer material price, are exactly the same as











18 It is also possible that the employment commitment may be more long-term than the internal contract.
Although this case is rarely likely in reality, the discussions regarding this timing scenario will be
relegated to Sub-section 1.3.5.
19 The change in the timing structure does not affect the equilibrium under vertical integration as a firm
always sets cm  .
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As before, in the first stage the wage rate and material price are determined via
the Generalized Nash Bargaining problem. The difference is that in this case I have
two independent bargaining problems, namely parallel bargaining. If either of
negotiations (or both) breaks down, all negotiating parties obtain nil in that labor and
materials are perfect complements. The collapse of either of bargaining implies that
there is no production taking place, and therefore the consolidated profit is zero while
the labor union obtains merely unemployment benefits. Specifically, the Nash
bargaining solutions to the wage rate and material price can be obtained by





























































By differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to w and m, respectively, and after some
manipulations, the first-order conditions can be obtained as
ooDI wwmaAw  ))(( (26)
ccwaBm DI  ))(( . (27)
The first-order conditions in (26) and (27) are analogous to the reaction functions in
the Cournot-Nash game.20 Given the linear demand function, since 1)(),(0   BA ,









20 It can be straightforwardly shown that the maximization problems (24) and (25) satisfy the second-










PROPOSITION 6 Given the linear demand and parallel bargaining structure, the Nash
bargaining solution for the wage (intermediate material price) is increasing
(decreasing) in the downstream firm’s relative negotiation power with respect to the
upstream firm and decreasing (increasing) in that with respect to the labor union.



















































With the parallel bargaining structure, the results according to Proposition 3
no longer hold since from (29) the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the material
price depends on the downstream firm’s relative bargaining power with respect to
both labor union ( ) and upstream firm ( ). The first part of Proposition 6 is not
surprising as higher downstream firm’s bargaining power for the wage (material price)
negotiation enables her to lower the negotiated wage (material price). The intuition
for the second part of Proposition 6 is that, given the parallel bargaining structure, the
bargaining position in the labor-management negotiation will affect the bargaining
between downstream and upstream firms, and vice versa. That is, the lower negotiated
wage (material price) as a result of an increase in the downstream firm’s bargaining
position will augment the surplus to be shared by the upstream firm (labor union),
resulting in an increase in the negotiated material price (wage).
By using (28) and (29), I can solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium










































PROPOSITION 7 Compared with the case where the inter-firm bargaining takes place
prior to the labor-management negotiation under the disintegrated structure, the
labor union is better-off when both negotiations are simultaneous.
Proof: By comparing (30) with (16), since  21,0)(),(  BA , and
thus 1)1( 2  AB , it follows that the wage rate, employment, and labor union’s
welfare must increase.
The intuition of Proposition 7 is that when the wage rate and material price
negotiations are undertaken simultaneously, the bargaining position of the
downstream firm with respect to the upstream firm seems to be improved. In other
words, the adverse impacts of double marginalization are mitigated, thereby raising
downstream firm’s surpluses, which are in turn shared by the labor union via the
labor-management negotiation. Note that under this timing structure the results
corresponding to Proposition 4 still hold in the sense that the union always prefers the










A change in the timing structure does affect the firm’s decision to merge. To
show this, it is more convenient to rewrite the consolidated profit of the vertically











Accordingly, the condition under which the firm will find the vertically integrated











Based on (32), I can portray the condition of parameters and  under which the
optimal organizational structures are formed in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: A Change in Vertical Integration Incentives under Successive Monopoly
and Parallel Bargaining
PROPOSITION 8 The firm is more likely to stay vertically disintegrated if I relax the
assumption that the inter-firm bargaining serves as long-term commitments such that
the wage rate and material price can be simultaneously negotiated.
Figure 1.2 suggests that when the negotiations for factor inputs, i.e., labor and
intermediate materials, switch from the successive bargaining to the simultaneous one,
the firm seems to have more incentives to disintegrate or decentralize the
organizational structure in that the area for vertical disintegration expands while that
for merger contracts. Given the relative bargaining power  and  , the change in
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timing structures from sequential to parallel negotiations implies that the downstream
firm will gain better negotiation with her upstream counterpart. This improvement in
the bargaining position can be easily seen by comparing the negotiated material prices
in (15) and (29). Clearly, since 1)1()1(  ABA , it must follow that the
downstream firm can purchase intermediate materials from her upstream counterpart
with lower prices if both negotiations can be negotiated at the same time. As a
consequence, with the aforementioned tradeoff the change in the timing structure
would make the vertically disintegrated organizational structure more attractive.
1.4 A Discussion of Bargaining Agendas
Under the assumption that the inter-firm negotiation is a long-term commitment, Sub-
sections 1.3.1-1.3.3 deal with the conditions under which the disintegrated firms have
an incentive to be vertically integrated. By the same token, Sub-section 1.3.4 centers
on the scenario in which both labor-management and inter-firm negotiations are
simultaneously undertaken. To complete my analysis, this section aims to briefly
discuss the scenario in which the labor-management bargaining takes place prior to
the other.
PROPOSITION 9 If the labor-management negotiation takes place prior to the inter-
firm negotiation, vertical integration will not entail losses of surpluses extracted by a
labor union, and hence the integration incentive always exists.
Proof: Given this timing structure, the generalized Nash bargaining solutions are the
reflection of those in Sub-section 1.3.1. Therefore, I can obtain
ooVIDI wwcaAww  ))(( and VIVImDI B   )1(
2 .
Since the negotiated wage is determined in the expectation of the negotiated
material price, vertical integration does not deteriorate the downstream firm’s wage
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negotiation outcome ( VIDI ww  ). This suggests that vertical integration has to do
solely with the gains from the elimination of double marginalization. Therefore, it
dominates the disintegrated structure, and my analysis is collapsed to the classical
case in which the firm always has an incentive to be vertically integrated. My results
may be contributed to the literature on the strategic use of the bargaining agendas
pioneered by Fershtman (1990)21 in the sense that if a disintegrated firm can choose
the timing or agendas of negotiations, she will never deal with the labor-management
prior to inter-firm bargaining as the absence of the tradeoff enables her to at least
obtain higher payoffs by vertical integration. Since I focus on the interaction between
both negotiations, which affect the vertical integration incentives, the rest of my
analysis will focus on the timing structure in which the inter-firm bargaining occurs
prior to the labor-management bargaining.
1.5 Upstream Foreclosure
In this section, I will extend my basic structure of vertical disintegration by
introducing the foreign outsourcing firm, who purchases a key intermediate input
from the domestic upstream firm and is then eligible to compete in the domestic
market, into the model. Following the conventional vertical foreclosure literature
(Salinger, 1988), the crucial assumption is that the upstream firm can credibly commit
to restricting the supply of key intermediate inputs exclusively to her downstream
counterpart only when the firm is vertically integrated. In this sense, upstream
foreclosure could be undertaken by vertical integration since the disintegrated
upstream firm always has an incentive to sell key intermediate inputs to the foreign
21 Fershtman (1990) employs the Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining model to show that the
timing or agendas of negotiations do affect the outcome. Furthermore, if the players have different
evaluations of the agenda, the equilibrium allocation of surpluses may not be efficient.
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outsourcer. Although it is by all means unappealing (see Reiffen, 1992 for the
criticism of this assumption) as a rational integrated firm may also serve intermediate
input markets, this assumption, due to the peculiarities of the labor-management and
inter-firm bargaining in my framework, is indispensable for obtaining the closed form
solution and developing further analyses. Indeed, the fact that vertical integration
results in foreclosure may be rationalized by two arguments. Firstly, the problem of a
credible commitment not to supply inputs to downstream rivals can be solved by take-
it-or-leave-it offers under vertical integration since it internalizes the losses of
monopoly rent via profit sharing (see Martin, et al., 2001 in Section 2 for more
detailed discussions). Secondly, the recent empirical evidence has suggested that the
integrated firms are likely to exclude their rivals from the access to intermediate
inputs (see Chipty, 2001 for the case of the cable television industry).
1.5.1 The Equilibrium with a Foreign Outsourcer
A natural question arising from introducing a foreign outsourcer is that: Why does the
firm allow the upstream firm to supply intermediate materials to foreign outsourcer,
thereby increasing competition in the final output market? I will relegate the
discussions regarding this question to next sub-section. For the time being, I focus
specifically on solving the equilibrium with the foreign outsourcer.
To see this more clearly, the structure of vertical disintegration with the
presence of a foreign outsourcer can be enumerated as follows. Consider two
downstream firms, domestic and foreign firms, producing homogeneous final output,
q and *q , respectively, and competing in the same (domestic) market based on the
Cournot competition. I assume that there are no transportation cost and trade frictions
in both upstream and downstream markets. In order to produce one unit of final
output, both domestic and foreign downstream firms are required to employ one unit
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of labor and one unit of key intermediate inputs, assumed to be exclusively produced
by the domestic upstream firm.22 Therefore, in order to enter a domestic market, the
foreign firm must strategically outsource the production of intermediate inputs by
bargaining over its price with the domestic upstream firm. In this sense, the foreign
firm is a strategic outsourcer.23 In words, both domestic downstream firm and foreign
outsourcer must bargain over the wage rate and the intermediate material price with
their own indigenous labor unions and the domestic upstream firm, respectively.
The timing structure is analogous to that in Section 1.3.1. In words, the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the wage rates, material prices, and outputs can be
determined by the three-stage game. In the first stage, both domestic downstream firm
and foreign outsourcer negotiate with the domestic upstream firm over the material
prices, m and *m , respectively. In the second stage, both domestic and foreign
downstream firms bargain with their own indigenous labor unions over the wage rates,
w and *w , respectively. Given the negotiated wages and material prices, in the final
stage both firms serve the same market by producing q and *q so as to maximize their
own profits. At the end of this three-stage game, the domestic firm realizes
consolidated profits of both downstream and upstream firms whereas the foreign
outsourcer realizes profits from serving the domestic market.24
By applying the standard backward induction procedure, I start off with the
final stage in which both domestic downstream firm and foreign outsourcer decide on
the profit-maximizing production, employment, and intermediate input. Given the
22 Alternatively, the production of intermediate inputs by a domestic upstream firm are assumed to be
sufficiently more efficient than the foreign firm such that it is always more profitable for her to buy
intermediate inputs from the domestic upstream firm, rather than producing in house.
23 My notion of strategic outsourcing is similar to that of Shy and Stenbacka (2003) and Chen et al.
(2004)
24 Given this timing structure, I still abide by my basic structure in which the inter-firm bargaining
takes place prior to the labor-management negotiation. However, it should be emphasized that my main
results do not qualitatively change if both types of negotiations simultaneously occur.
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assumption on the demand function as before, the profit functions of both downstream
firms can be given as
 qwmqqpDO  )(
*
 (33)
and   ***** )( qwmqqpDO  . (34)
The subscript DO aims to characterize downstream firms with the foreign outsourcing
firm. To characterize the equilibrium, I, rather than developing discussions in a
general way, will assume the linear functional form of the final output demand as
before. By differentiating (33) and (34) with respect to q and *q , respectively, it is
straightforward to show that the optimal outputs and the maximized profits as

























Next, I move onto the second stage of the labor-management negotiation. The labor
unions’ objective functions take the same forms as (3). I assume that the rate of
unemployment benefits is the same in both countries ( *oo ww  ), and the downstream
firms’ bargaining power with respect to the labor unions are identical ( )*  .
Accordingly, the Nash bargaining solutions to domestic and foreign wage rates can be











































































If the negotiations with the indigenous labor unions break down, the domestic
downstream firm and the foreign outsourcer obtain zero payoff since no production
takes place whereas the unions obtain unemployment benefits, Lwo and
*Lwo , for the
domestic and foreign labor unions, respectively. By differentiating (36) and (37) with
respect to w and *w , respectively, the first-order conditions corresponding to the























Though tedious, solving (38) and (39) for the solutions of w and *w as functions of











































Note that in equilibrium Proposition 2 still holds in the sense that an increase in the
firms’ relative bargaining power with the labor unions will reduce the negotiated
wage rates. One may also check that the negotiated wages are decreasing in their own
material costs and increasing in opponents’ material costs ( 0**  mwmw
and 0**  mwmw ).
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Then, I substitute (40) and (41) into (35). The optimal productions,































































































































** )()( DODOMO qcmqcm  . (42)
The subscript MO characterizes the upstream firm under the presence of a foreign
outsourcing firm. As in the second stage, the first stage also deals with a pair of
negotiations: domestic downstream firm versus domestic upstream firm; and foreign
outsourcer versus domestic upstream firm. For the analytical purpose, I assume that
the relative bargaining power of the domestic downstream firm and the foreign
outsourcer with respect to the domestic upstream firm is the same ( *  ), and the
case where two parallel negotiations simultaneously break down is ruled out. Hence,
the Nash bargaining solutions to material prices, m and *m , can be characterized by
solving the following asymmetric Nash bargaining problems.
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Essentially, if either of negotiations breaks down, although the payoffs to the
domestic downstream firm in case of the break down of (43) and to the foreign
outsourcer in case of the break down of (44) are still zero (as no production occurs),
the payoffs to the domestic upstream firm is not. Specifically, if the negotiation
between domestic downstream and upstream firms breaks down, the upstream firm
obtains oMO , which is the profits from supplying materials to the foreign outsourcer,
who becomes the sole producer in final output market. Likewise, if the other
bargaining breaks down, the domestic upstream firm earns *oMO , which is the profits
from sharing monopoly rent with the domestic downstream firm.25
By differentiating (43) and (44) with respect to m and *m , respectively, the
































































One may discern that the asymmetric Nash bargaining problems (43) and (44) are
symmetric in the sense that (43) can be obtained by replacing m by *m and,
reciprocally, *m by m . Hence, in equilibrium it must hold that *mm  . By imposing
the symmetry condition on (42), (45) and (46), it can be shown that the Nash
bargaining solutions to material prices are given by










25 The derivations of oMO and
*o
MO can be directly seen from )(mm in (13) where the downstream
firm is assumed to be a monopoly in the final output market.
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By differentiating (47) with respect to  and  , it can be shown that
0)(  owcam  and  m 0)(  owca , and therefore
the results differ from Proposition 3 but are consistent with Proposition 6. With the
competition in the final output market, the Nash bargaining solutions to material
prices are increasing in the relative bargaining power of the domestic downstream
firm and the foreign outsourcer with respect to the indigenous labor unions ( ) and
decreasing in those with respect to the domestic upstream firm ( ). As mentioned
previously, the second part is easily understandable as better bargaining positions
with the domestic upstream firm should results in lower negotiated material prices.
The first part, in contrast, can be explained by the fact that the better positions in the
labor-management negotiations will enlarge the surpluses that will be shared by the
domestic upstream firm.











Apparently, this is also consistent with Proposition 6 in that 0 w and 0 w .
An improvement in the labor-management bargaining positions ( ) would entail
lower negotiated wage rates, and an increase in the relative bargaining power of the
domestic downstream firm and the foreign outsourcer with the domestic upstream
firm (  ), which surely reduces the negotiated material prices, will result in higher
surpluses to be shared with the indigenous labor unions.
By using (47) and (48), the equilibrium production, domestic downstream
firm’s profit, foreign strategic outsourcer’s profit, domestic upstream firm’s profit,








































































Since the disagreement points of the domestic upstream firm are non-zero, the Nash
bargaining solutions derived in (49) will exist only if *oMO
o
MOMO   . One can
check that this condition always holds since 16)3(3  .
1.5.2 Upstream Foreclosure Decisions
The previous sub-section is concerned with the scenario in which the domestic firm
welcomes foreign competition by allowing her disintegrated upstream firm to supply
the key intermediate inputs for the foreign outsourcer via the asymmetric Nash
bargaining. Given that the domestic firm has a full control over key intermediate
inputs production, she may strategically foreclose the foreign competition by
exclusively procuring intermediate inputs from the upstream firm via vertical
integration, which in turn enables her to monopolize the final output market.26 In this
sense, the upstream foreclosure decisions have to do with two tradeoffs: (1)
monopoly rents in the final output market versus losses of the upstream firm’s
surpluses extracted from the foreign outsourcer (2) gains from the elimination of
double marginalization versus the losses of the worsened wage negotiation. In this
sub-section, I argue that the domestic firm will strategically foreclose foreign
26 Recall that I assume that the in-house production of intermediate inputs by the foreign firm is
sufficiently inefficient such that the only way to enter domestic market is to outsource those materials
from domestic firm.
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competition if domestic downstream firm’s bargaining positions with the indigenous
labor union and the upstream firm are sufficiently advantageous.
The condition under which the domestic firm will find strategic foreclosure
















































By using (51), I can find the ranges of and  in which strategic foreclosure is
profitable, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Upstream Foreclosure Incentives
PROPOSITION 10 The domestic downstream firm will exercise upstream foreclosure
if its relative bargaining power with the indigenous labor union (  ) and the
upstream firm (  ) is sufficiently high.
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Intuitively, if the downstream firm’s relative bargaining positions with the
indigenous labor union and the upstream firm are sufficiently high, the monopoly rent
from being a sole producer in the final output market is also high. In which case, the
gains from monopoly rent and elimination of double marginalization will outweigh
the losses of upstream firm’s surpluses from serving the foreign outsourcer and the
worsened negotiated wage, and thus the domestic firm will strategically foreclose
foreign competition by integrating the upstream firm to supply intermediate inputs
only internally. On the contrary, if her controls over employment and intermediate
inputs procurement are low, it will be more profitable to welcome foreign
competition, which enables the domestic firm to extract surpluses via the inter-firm
negotiation and obtain the lower negotiated wage.
By combining the results corresponding to Proposition 5, Figure 1.3 reveals
that the integration incentives may be affected by downstream competition. With the
parameters of  and  lying in the dark grey area, the integrated firm under
successive monopoly may be self-motivated to be disintegrated in face of
downstream competition. The high value of 1 (low  ) implies that the losses of
surpluses extracted from the foreign outsourcing firm are sufficiently high such that
the net losses of upstream foreclosure from the first tradeoff dominate the net gains
from the second. On the contrary, if the bargaining parameters lie in the light grey
area, the disintegrated firm under successive monopoly will choose to merge, thereby
excluding a foreign downstream firm from the market. With the low value of 1
(high  ), the losses of surpluses extracted from the foreign outsourcing firm are
sufficiently infinitesimal such that the net gains from the second tradeoff dominate
the net losses from the first.
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1.6. Conclusion
This chapter is related to the optimal organizational structures with the presence of
unionization, inter-firm bargaining, and the strategic anti-competitive effects of
vertical integration under the presence of a foreign outsourcer. My basic structure
abstracts from the standard successive monopoly framework. Not only do I nest the
inter-firm negotiation via the Generalized Nash Bargaining, but I also generalize the
labor-management negotiation by taking into account the negotiation asymmetry.
My results contribute to the literature on the interaction between unionization
and management in the following ways. It is well established that the firm always has
an incentive to be vertically integrated due to the ‘double marginalization’. However,
the incentives to merge may be dissipated if the industry is unionized since the
vertical integration deteriorates the firm’s bargaining position with the labor union.
Given these well-known results, I further reveal that, despite the existence of
unionization, the merger incentives remain if the downstream firm’s bargaining power
with the labor union is relatively high compared with that with the upstream firm.
Furthermore, if labor employment and intermediate inputs procurement can be
simultaneously, rather than sequentially, negotiated, the firm is more likely to stay
vertically disintegrated. To complete my analysis, I argue that if the disintegrated firm
can strategically manipulate the negotiation agendas, she will never undertake the
labor-management bargaining prior to the other.
Given my basic structure of vertical disintegration with the inter-firm
bargaining and unionization, I extend the model to account for how anti-competitive
effects of merger, so called upstream foreclosure, changes the vertical integration
incentives. I introduce the foreign downstream firm who may strategically outsource
intermediate inputs production in order to enter a domestic market. By invoking the
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standard foreclosure assumption (Salinger, 1988) that vertical integration provides the
upstream firm a credible commitment to cease the intermediate inputs supply to of her
foreign downstream rival, a disintegrated firm may exercise upstream foreclosure by
vertically integrating those vertically linked firms and enjoy monopoly rent. In
contrast, the decisions to supply the inputs externally enable the domestic firm to
extract surpluses from the foreign outsourcer via the Generalized Nash Bargaining,
thereby facing foreign competition in the final output market. Based on this structure,
I show that the foreign outsourcer’s access to key intermediate inputs will be
strategically foreclosed if the downstream firm has enough bargaining advantages
over the labor union and the upstream firm. Accordingly, my extension highlights the
pivotal roles of the labor-management and inter-firm negotiations that shed further
light on the interaction between intermediate input and final output markets.
Throughout this chapter, the relative bargaining powers are treated as
exogenously given. Although exogeneity of players’ bargaining powers is justifiable
as they depend on factors exogenous to the players, such as the labor standard,
vertical market structures, degree of unionization, etc., it may be interesting to
endogenize the relative bargaining powers in light of future research. For example, the
domestic government may choose the relative negotiation powers in the labor-
management negotiation to maximize the country’s welfare.
This chapter omits some plausible cases, such as the domestic firm as a
purchaser of intermediate inputs from foreign firms and foreign outsourcing under
vertically integrated domestic firms. Although the omissions make it less than
exhaustive, I have specifically pointed out the importance of the labor-management
and inter-firm negotiations on the antitrust issue. The antitrust practitioners may
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AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN US: A PRIMAL APPROACH
2.1 Introduction
For the last two decades, I have observed a remarkable increase in outsourcing in the
world. Two strands of literature investigating this ongoing phenomenon have emerged.
The first strand takes the view that the increase in outsourcing emanates from the
decline in transaction costs in connection with the intensified use of information
technology (see, for instance, Abraham and Taylor, 1996). 27 The main research
question in this literature concerns the impact of outsourcing activities on productivity.
In the second strand, the trade-related aspects of outsourcing have attracted increasing
attention (see, for instance, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999). The main subject here
is the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality for skilled and unskilled workers. The
former strand centers on a firm’s decision to contract out business activities and does
not distinguish between international and domestic outsourcing28 (I have coined the
term “general outsourcing” to describe this) or between skilled and unskilled labor
productivity, whereas the latter strand deals with the role of mainly international
outsourcing as a mechanism for moving unskilled-intensive production to unskilled-
abundant countries, thereby affecting wage differentials within industries.29
Is there any link between these two strands? In this chapter, I argue that, given
the nature of competitive economies, the skilled and unskilled labor productivity
impacts of general and international outsourcing and their wage differentials may be
27 In this view, outsourcing may also be termed a “make-or-buy” decision (Grossman and Helpman,
2002), “vertical disintegration” (Holmes, 1999), “fragmentation” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001),
“vertical specialization” (Hummels et al., 2001).
28 Girma and Görg (2004) argue that since the subsequent productivity effects are of their interests, it
should not matter whether outsourcing takes place internationally and domestically.
29 For a theoretical treatment of international outsourcing, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Deardorff
(2001), Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001).
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related. My idea is that either general outsourcing or international outsourcing may be
biased toward skilled labor productivity, and thus the biased impacts on skilled labor
productivity may result in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers in
labor markets. I attempt to empirically investigate such linkages based on six-digit
NAICS US manufacturing industries. I also examine what type of outsourcing is more
significant in explaining the linkages.
Previous studies have investigated either the impacts of outsourcing on the
overall labor productivity (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Girma and Görg, 2004; and
Amiti and Wei, 2006 among others) or the impacts of international outsourcing on the
relative demand for skilled labor (Feenstra and Hansen, 1996; and Anderton and
Brenton, 1999 among others). The present chapter contributes to the former literature
in the sense that I attempt to investigate the effects of both general and international
outsourcing on the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled workers, instead of
the overall labor productivity. Moreover, my results may also be complementary with
the latter literature if the labor productivity impact of general outsourcing is skilled-
biased. 30
The mechanisms through which general and international outsourcing shift the
relative demand for skilled workers, are different. According to the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the industries in developed economies, where skilled labor is
well endowed, import the unskilled-intensive intermediate inputs. This will shift the
relative demand for skilled workers and therefore explain the intra-industry wage
differential between skilled and unskilled labor. In contrast, general outsourcing may
also explain the shift in the relative demand for skilled workers if productivity gains
30 A fundamental difference between general outsourcing (contracting out the production of
intermediate inputs at arm’s length) and the purchase of other factors of production, such as capital and
raw materials, is that a firm faces the decisions whether a particular intermediate input will be
internalized (produced in house) or contracted out at arm’s length (outsourced).
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from general outsourcing are more pronounced for skilled workers. The reason for the
skilled-biased effect associated with general outsourcing is that each stage of
production is different in skilled labor intensity. If the industries contract out the
unskilled-intensive production of intermediate inputs, the productivity improvement
from allocating the existing labor to skilled-intensive production should be more
substantiated for skilled workers, thereby shifting the relative demand for skilled
workers.
I adopt a primal approach. That is, I directly estimate the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) value-added function for the US manufacturing case.31 Hence, my
framework may be subject to the potential endogeneity problem, resulting in
inconsistent estimators, due to the fact that outsourcing decisions may be
endogenously determined by other industry-specific factors. I tackle this problem by
employing two-step non-linear estimators with instrument variables. Such a primal
approach is different from that employed in existing studies in this area, in which a
dual approach, estimating cost-share function, has commonly been used. However,
according to Mundlak (1996), the estimates based on a primal approach, unlike
indirect estimators of the cost function, can optimally utilize all the available
information and therefore are statistically efficient.
The literature on the impacts of outsourcing on the relative demands for
skilled workers typically assume the Cobb-Douglas value added function and derive
the short-run cost function based on the assumption of constant returns to scale.
However, in this chapter I employ the CES specification. The CES value added
function may be more appealing than the Cobb-Douglas one for the following reasons.
First, it does not assume the degree of factor substitutability a priori. Furthermore, it
31 In an approach similar to mine, Egger and Egger (2006) construct an equation of the unskilled labor
average productivity, using the constant elasticity of the substitution production function, and estimate
it to see the impact of international outsourcing on unskilled labor productivity in the case of the EU.
44
may convey efficient and unbiased estimates if the true production function is not
homogenous of degree one.
The main benefit of this approach lies in the fact that it provides us with a
unified framework in which I can link outsourcing and labor productivity and then
link labor productivity and wage differentials. For the first link, the primal approach,
estimating production functions, enables us to construct a marginal productivity of
skilled and unskilled labor. Furthermore, I can investigate the segregated impacts of
general and international outsourcing on skilled and unskilled labor productivity,
respectively.32 For the second link, by utilizing the marginal productivities of skilled
and unskilled workers in the two different outsourcing environments, I can examine
the impact of the outsourcing activities on wage differentials, given the nature of
competitive economies.
My main findings can be elaborated as follows. First, general and international
outsourcing entails positive non-neutral technological shifts of skilled and unskilled
workers. More importantly, they are all skill-biased in the sense that non-neutral
productivity gains from specialization in core-competent activities are more
pronounced for skilled workers. Second, on average, general and international
outsourcing brings about a productivity improvement for both unskilled and skilled
workers in both the short run and the long run. However, I further find that, in the
case of international outsourcing, the positive productivity gains prevail only in high-
tech industries. Finally, the wage gaps in the US between skilled and unskilled
workers during the period 2002-2005 are affected to a greater degree by general
outsourcing than by international outsourcing, both in the short run and in the long
run.
32 As elaborated in next section, neither of the literature strands distinguishes between the skilled and
unskilled labor productivity impacts of general and international outsourcing.
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In summary, my results show that the wage inequality of US manufacturing
industries during 2002-2005 is mainly due to the skill-biased labor productivity effect
of general outsourcing rather than that of international outsourcing. Accordingly, in
addition to the existing literature emphasizing the role of international trade in
intermediate inputs as a way of explaining the increasing wage inequality within
industries, the present chapter shows that the productivity mechanism through which
both domestic and international outsourcing affects labor productivity with a bias
toward skilled workers, thereby changing their rewards, may be another
rationalization of the relationships among outsourcing, labor productivity, and wage
inequality.
The organization of this chapter can be outlined briefly as follows. In Section
2.2, the two strands of the outsourcing literature are outlined. I elaborate on the
theoretical discussions regarding value-added analysis and CES frameworks in
Section 2.3. The empirical methodology and data measurement are discussed in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results and economic analyses. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Review of the Literature
The present chapter represents a link between two strands of literature on outsourcing.
On the one hand, this chapter is compatible with those dealing with the labor
productivity impacts of outsourcing. On the other hand, my methodology can also be
extended to capture the essence of the literature on outsourcing as the explanatory
variable for wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers within industries.
Accordingly, this section presents a brief review of both strands of the literature.
2.2.1 Outsourcing and Labor Productivity
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Among the very first studies offering a more detailed analysis of offshore outsourcing
and its effects on productivity33 is that of Egger and Egger (2006). They rigorously
explore the impacts on productivity of low-skilled workers using data on 22
manufacturing industries in 12 EU nations during 1992-1997. Based on a narrow
definition of international outsourcing and using the CES production function, they
find that a 1 percent rise in offshore outsourcing brings about a drop in low-skilled
labor productivity by 0.18 percent in the short run. In the long run, nevertheless, an
improvement in productivity can be observed.
Amiti and Wei (2006) study the impact of offshore outsourcing on overall
labor productivity, rather than on low-skilled labor productivity, utilizing the data of
96 US manufacturing industries during 1992-2000. They find a positive effect of
offshore material and service outsourcing on overall labor productivity, but large
positive effects exist for service outsourcing. Specifically, they show that an increase
of 1 percentage point in the intensity of service outsourcing leads to an increase in
labor productivity from 0.30 to 0.37 percentage points.
Focusing on general outsourcing with plant-level data, Girma and Görg (2004)
analyze the impact of service outsourcing on labor productivity for three segregated
UK manufacturing industries during 1982-1992. They find that labor productivity is
positively affected by service outsourcing.
Analyzing data for 652 establishments covering 12 subsectors of the electronic
industry in the Republic of Ireland during 1990-1995, Görg and Hanley (2003)
estimate the effect of offshore outsourcing on labor productivity. They segregate the
sample into sub-sectors of plants operating either downstream or upstream and find
that a positive impact of outsourcing on labor productivity prevails downstream.
33 See Olsen (2006) for a more complete survey on impacts of outsourcing on productivities
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Although these studies have contributed to the literature by showing the
existence of a link between outsourcing and productivity, I think that, as far as US
manufacturing industries are concerned, the productivity impacts of outsourcing are
still not clear in the following senses. First, I do not really know whether international
outsourcing matters more than general outsourcing in the study of labor productivity
in the US. Second, most of them assume a Cobb-Douglas production function in their
studies, while Egger and Egger (2006) assume a CES production function with perfect
substitution between unskilled and skilled labor. Hence, to us, it is unclear whether
production function specifications matter or not. Third, I am not sure whether a skill-
biased productivity impact of outsourcing exists in US industries. This third point is
important because it would give us an insight into the effect of outsourcing on wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor for the US manufacturing sectors.
2.2.2 Outsourcing and Wage Inequality
This strand of literature focuses on the impact of outsourcing, defined as imports of
intermediate goods, on wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) provide one of the first empirical assessments of
the impact of international outsourcing on the relative demand for unskilled and
skilled workers using data from US manufacturing industries during the 1980s and
1990s. As usual, the dual approach is employed in such a way that the translog cost
share equation for non-production workers is derived from the cost minimization
problem. They conclude that international outsourcing has a positive impact on the
wage gap in the US. Interestingly, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that
technological progress plays an equally important role in explaining the wage gap.
Since then, these have been considered the two main competing hypotheses for the
wage-differentials impact of outsourcing.
48
An analogous approach to the empirical investigation of the impact of
outsourcing on wage inequality has been undertaken by various authors using non-US
data. For instance, Anderton and Brenton (1999) estimate the impact of international
outsourcing on UK textile and mechanical engineering industries.34 However, they
find that international outsourcing has no significant impact on the non-production
wage share in general. Diehl (1999) provides empirical evidence for the impact of
international outsourcing on German manufacturing industries between 1978 and
1990. He finds that international outsourcing has only a weak impact on the skill
structure of employment in German manufacturing. However, Geishecker (2002)
finds a negative effect of international outsourcing on the relative demand for
unskilled workers in the case of Germany. Concerning a large relocation of unskilled
jobs to China and a sharp decline in the importance of manufacturing as a corollary of
the opening up of the Chinese economy, Hsieh and Woo (2005) show that the relative
demand for skilled workers in Hong Kong increased sharply at exactly the same time
when outsourcing to China began to increase in the early 1980s.
The literature seems to suggest that international outsourcing is skill-biased in
that skilled workers earn more than unskilled workers do. However, I feel that I need
to further investigate a more detailed mechanism for factors that affect wage
inequality for the following reasons. First, since most of the studies in this strand use
a dual approach to estimating cost-share functions, they assume away the important
element of production technology and instead argue that international trade in
intermediate inputs plays a role akin to exporting unskilled jobs abroad. In fact,
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show the importance of considering technology when
seeking to explain the wage gap. The fact that outsourcing and technological progress
34 In contrast with Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Anderton and Brenton (1999) do distinguish between
international outsourcing in low- and high-wage countries. The idea is that low-skilled activities are
typically outsourced to low-wage countries.
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can affect wage inequality implies that a systematic interaction between outsourcing
and technology may exist. Second, since outsourcing activities can be interpreted as
firms contracting business out at arm’s length (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002
among others), there is no fundamental difference between international and domestic
outsourcing. In this regard, I may want to know which type of outsourcing is more
related to technology and thus has a greater explanatory power for wage inequality
2.3 Background of Value-Added Analysis and Production Theory
In this section, I will briefly outline a primal approach to directly estimating
production function, a constant elasticity of substitution production function, which
was also used in Egger and Egger (2006).35 Furthermore, my empirical strategy of
investigating the outsourcing impacts on labor productivity and on their wage
differentials will be elaborated.
2.3.1 A Primal Approach to Value-Added Analysis
Consider an industry i where i = 1,…, n, producing a single gross output iQ with the
following production function expressed in a primal form:
),,,( iOiiiii LHKQQ  , (52)
where iK , iH , and iL are given quantities of capital stock, skilled labor, and
unskilled labor, respectively, and iO is a vector of domestically and internationally
sourced intermediate inputs. Following Fuss, McFadden, and Mundlak (1978), the
real value added of industry i is defined as
iO iiiii QHLKV ),,( . (53)
35 They estimated a derived average labor productivity equation, but I estimate the production function
itself.
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Since my objective is to analyze the economic impacts of both general and
international outsourcing on skilled and unskilled labor productivities, I will focus on
the role of iO , the index of either general or international outsourcing. Furthermore,
one of the econometric issues arising out of my primal approach is the extent to which
the choice of intermediate inputs is endogenous. To address this, instead of using the
production function (52), I will estimate the real value-added function (53) in that the
intermediate inputs will not enter this function directly.
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Here, iiA e
  
 represents the “technological level” for industry i,37 with 
and  representing parameters of an independent technology shifter and a factor-
neutral technology effect of outsourcing, respectively, and r refers to the degree of
scale economies. Elasticities of substitution ( ) between labor and capital can be





iL are optimally chosen capital, skilled labor, and
unskilled labor by industry i in term of efficiency units, in order to maximize profits.
Since my objective is to reveal the productivity impacts of outsourcing on workers, I
assume that the productivity impacts of outsourcing work through two channels:
36 For the sake of computational simplicity, I implicitly assume that the contributions of each factor of
production to value added are equally weighted. Though this assumption is rather strong, allowing for
different weights for value-added contributions does not change my main results qualitatively.
37 Since I center on the impacts of outsourcing on labor productivity, I need to assume that the effects
of other factors on technology level, such as innovation and product development, is comprehensively
taken into account by iA .
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neutral ( ) and labor-augmenting technological shifts. As such, the capital-
augmenting effect, without loss of generality, is normalized to unity, and the
efficiency unit of capital is thus equal to the amount of capital employed; that
is, ii KK 
* . Furthermore, since there are two groups of labor, skilled labor ( iH ) and





 , where   H iH ia e
 
  and   L iL ia e
 
  are measures of skilled- and
unskilled-augmenting technical progress, respectively, and H and L are
parameters for skilled- and unskilled-augmenting effects of outsourcing, respectively.
2.3.2 The Impacts of Outsourcing on Productivity
As discussed later, in the empirical analyses I aim to estimate the CES production
function (54) based on six-digit NAICS US manufacturing industries. Once all
parameters embedded in (54) have been estimated, I can infer some implications
regarding the impacts of outsourcing on the productivity of skilled and unskilled
workers. Unlike Egger and Egger (2006) and Amiti and Wei (2006), as I center on
empirically investigating how the roles of outsourcing differently affect the
productivities of unskilled and skilled labor, I shall derive the marginal value added of
unskilled and skilled workers, denoted by LiMV and HiMV , respectively, as the proxies
of unskilled- and skilled-labor productivity.39 By differentiating (54) with respect to
iL and iH and using a natural logarithm, I have
38 In contrast with existing studies on the impact of international outsourcing, such as that of Feenstra
and Hanson (1996), I assume that substitutions between skilled and unskilled workers, skilled workers
and capital, and unskilled workers and capital, are equal. Nevertheless, I also tried the case where
unskilled and skilled workers are perfect substitutes. I find that my results are qualitatively unchanged.
39 To us, the marginal value added of workers may better reflect their productivity and thus be
economically more appealing, compared with value added per worker, in that the impacts of
outsourcing on skilled and unskilled labor are allowed to differently affect their productivities.
Moreover, by looking at marginal impacts, I am able to capture some links between productivity and
the relative demand for labor.
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where iiLi LVMV  and iiHi HVMV  .
To capture the impact of outsourcing on unskilled and skilled labor
productivity proxied by their marginal value added, it is straightforward to derive the
elasticities of unskilled- and skilled-labor productivity with respect to outsourcing
indexes from (55) and (56). Therefore, I will report the productivity impacts of
outsourcing by elasticities of the marginal productivity of both skilled and unskilled
workers with respect to outsourcing:
1L L i i Vr r
 
   
 
 
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 
(57)
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 
 
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 
, (58)
where iV V  lnln .
My primal approach to productivity analysis, in contrast with the existing
literature which assumes a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function, 40
enables us to segregate the productivity effects of outsourcing in more details. As
shown in (57)-(58), one can separate the total productivity impact of outsourcing into
three parts: factor-productivity effect, technology effect, and value-added effect.
First, the factor-productivity effect of outsourcing is represented by the first
term in (57) and (58), and shows the partial effect of outsourcing on productivity vis-
à-vis technology improvement augmented to that factor of production; that is, L in
40 See Olsen (2006) for a survey of literature using a Cobb-Douglas production function for the
empirical analysis of the relationship between outsourcing and productivity.
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the unskilled equation and H in the skilled equation. One may observe that
productivity impacts of outsourcing across skilled groups are different solely
according to the factor-productivity effect. Second, the technology effect of
outsourcing is represented by the second terms in (57) and (58), and captures that part
of the effect of outsourcing which affects labor productivity through neutral
technological progress. As one can see from the equations, if there is no impact from
outsourcing (that is, even if H = 0 and L = 0), the factors employed still play a role
in determining the marginal productivity of labor. Lastly, the value-added effect is
captured by the final terms of (57) and (58), and is meant to account for the impacts of
outsourcing on overall value added. Given that outsourcing has an effect on
productivity, the improvement of factor productivities, either by neutral or non-neutral
effects, or both, will give rise to changes in the employment of factor of productions
and therefore the overall value added.
2.3.3 The Linkages among Outsourcing, Productivity, and Wage Inequality
This section examines the impacts of international outsourcing on the relative
marginal productivity of skilled and unskilled workers. 41 By using the profit
maximization condition, the wage inequality represented by the ratio of skilled to
unskilled wages must be equal to the ratio of skilled to unskilled marginal value added.
Intuitively, in a competitive economy where firms reward factors of production to an
extent equal with the value of their marginal product, an increase in the marginal
productivity of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers must entail an
41 A number of studies have examined the roles of international outsourcing on explaining the evidence
of rising relative skilled wage during 1980s in most OECD and newly industrialized economies, such
as Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) (US), Feenstra and Hanson (1997) (Mexico) Anderton and
Brenton (1999) (UK), Geishecker (2002) (Germany), Hsieh and Woo (2005) (Hong Kong), and so
forth.
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increase in the wages of skilled labor relative to those of unskilled labor. That is,
















From (59), it is straightforward to figure out the elasticities of relative skilled














Since it is well established that outsourcing more or less accounts for the widening of
the wage inequality gap, I expect that the estimated parameters will satisfy LH   .42
Intuitively, (60) implies that outsourcing can account for wage inequality only if its
impacts on labor is skill-biased ( LH   ).
This ends my theoretical discussions regarding the linkages among
outsourcing, factor-augmenting technological progress, labor productivity, and wage
inequality. Based on the theoretical analysis I have developed thus far, the empirical
estimation of the impacts of outsourcing on labor productivity linking to the literature
on mainstream wage inequality will be thoroughly discussed in the next section.
2.4 Data and Empirical Methodology
2.4.1 Data
I use three main datasets from the US Census Bureau Annual Survey of Manufactures
(ASM) for the period 2002-2005 and the US International Trade Statistics and
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
42 Elaborated in Section 2.2, these empirical findings are confirmed by a number of studies in various
economies. Nevertheless, the results make use of the dual approach in the sense that a relative increase
in the relative demand for skilled workers is derived from either cost or profit functions. In contrast to
these studies, my methodology is to directly estimate production functions to see whether the same
results are confirmed.
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The disaggregated production, detailed intermediate inputs, capital stocks, and
employment data are retrieved from the ASM for the period 2002-2005. This provides
322 six-digit NAICS manufacturing industries categorized according to three-digit
NAICS manufacturing industries. Based on a three-digit classification, the US
manufacturing sectors can be divided into 21 sub-sectors. The manufacturing sector
(sectors 31-33) comprises establishments engaged in the mechanical, physical, or
chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into new products.
Table 2.1: Summary of Statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Value added 1268 6285659 9561474 132908 1.05E+08
K 1268 479131.8 1107001 4364 1.66E+07
H 1268 12753.45 17864.56 299 188148
L 1268 30339.41 43168.11 514 471589
Gen 1268 0.734529 0.113525 0.289509 0.983395
Inter 1268 0.087344 0.095714 0.004174 0.403511
Note: 1) Value added and capitals are in terms of $1,000. Non-production and production workers are
in terms of the average number of persons engaged in non-production and production activities,
respectively. 2) Mean values are calculated across cross-section and time horizons.
Table 2.2: Correlation matrix of variables.
Value added K H L Gen Inter
Value added 1.0000
K 0.4151 1.0000
H 0.7129 0.2876 1.0000
L 0.5982 0.2756 0.7892 1.0000
Gen 0.1220 0.0646 -0.1529 -0.0670 1.0000
Inter 0.1114 0.1166 0.0488 -0.1660 0.1444 1.0000
Note: 1) Value added and capitals are in terms of $1,000. Non-production and production workers are
in terms of the average number of persons engaged in non-production and production activities,
respectively. 2) Mean values are calculated across cross-section and time horizons.
Combined from these data sources, the relevant variables employed in my
empirical estimations are value added ( itV ), capital stock ( itK ), production workers
( itL ), non-production workers ( itH ), general outsourcing index ( itGenO ), and
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international outsourcing index ( itInterO ) at six-digit NAICS manufacturing
industries. Value added is proxied by the value of sales, shipments, receipts, revenue,
or business done, less the cost of materials and service purchases. Capital stock is
proxied by buildings, land, and machinery. Production workers are the average
number of persons engaged in production activities while non-production workers are
those employed in non-production activities. As conventionally utilized, the skilled
and unskilled workers are proxied by non-production and production workers.
The index of general outsourcing intensity ( itGen ) is the ratio of “cost of
intermediate inputs received” by an establishment to total non-energy production
costs, which is directly calculated from the ASM dataset at the six-digit NAICS
manufacturing-industry level. The index of international outsourcing ( itInter ),
following the broad definition of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), is defined as the share







with ijtD referring to the ratio of intermediate input j purchased by industry i to total
non-energy production costs employed by industry i, calculated using the annual
input-output tables from 2002-2005 based on the BEA 1992 benchmark tables in
which NAICS industries are disaggregated at the three-digit level. The term
( /jt jtM Q ) is the ratio of imported intermediate input j ( jM ) to total production j ( jQ )
calculated by using the international trade data at the three-digit NAICS industry level
from the US International Trade Statistics, US Census Bureau. A summary of
statistics and their correlation matrixes are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Since the ASM is available only for four years (2002-2005), ones may cast
doubt on if the variation in the outsourcing indices is sufficient over the years.
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However, the cross-industry variation of the outsourcing indexes measured at the six-
digit NAICS disaggregation level may be sufficient to offset the little variation across
the time horizon. I acknowledge that the extension of my dataset will shed light on
improvement of the empirical results and leave it for future research.
2.4.2 Econometric Methodology: A Primal Approach
Short-run estimation
Using annual data from 2002 to 2005, I first employ the fixed effect non-linear
least squares to estimate the CES specification in (54) in order to account for the
industry-specific and time-specific effects. Hence, the econometric model under the
CES specification as in (54) can be modified by introducing an industry dummy ( i )
and a time dummy ( t ). By taking a natural logarithm and adding the stochastic error
term, it it can be specified as follows:
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As noted in Amiti and Wei (2006), Egger and Egger (2006), and Girma and
Görg (2004), there might be an econometric problem of potential endogeneity of
outsourcing. That is, the estimated parameters may be biased. To tackle this problem,
I shall employ a two-step non-linear least squares estimation (see Greene, 2003, pp.
183-186)44 as follows:
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The variables of outsourcing intensity are instrumented by 1) the average unit
production ( Lw ) and non-production labor ( Hw ) cost, 2) the ratio of high-tech capital
43 The stochastic error term, it can be interpreted as neutral technological shocks.
44 The two-step non-linear least squares estimator, as first shown by Murphy and Topel (1985), has an
important and desirable asymptotic property. That is, under the standard conditions assumed for the
non-linear least squares estimators, the second-step estimators are consistent and asymptotically
normally distributed with an asymptotic covariance matrix.
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to total capital (T ), and 3) the ratio of energy consumption to total production cost
( ENERGY ). All these variables are from the ASM for the period 2002-2005.
Intuitively, the first instrument is employed in that, as discussed in Girma and Görg
(2004), outsourcing is a substitute for in-house production and will therefore lead to a
decline in the total wage bill. Hence, in some sense the outsourcing intensities might
be correlated with wages as an opportunity cost that might have been incurred for in-
house employees if the production activities had not been contracted out. The second
and third instruments are introduced to capture the idea that the outsourcing decisions
may be associated with the industry-specific high-tech capital intensity (T) and the
rate of energy consumption. The first-stage regression shows that all instrumental
variables are strongly correlated with the general or international outsourcing.45
itititHitLit ENERGYTwwGenO *0118.*0468.0032.*0608.*3497. 
(.0844) (.0226) (.0322) (.0046) (.0042)
1754.2 R *04.79F
itititHitLit ENERGYTwwInterO *0014.0002.*0141.*0045.*0618. 
(.0060) (.0017) (.0021) (.0004) (.0004)
1567.2 R *70.49F
Furthermore, it is well known that a potential instrumental variable is not only
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, but also exogenous. A number of
reasons may justify the exogeneity of the aforementioned instrumental variables. First,
since there are a large number of firms in an industry in my dataset, a firm is unlikely
to be a monopsony in the labor market. Hence, it is justifiable that the unit labor costs
are exogenous to the firms. Moreover, since our time horizon in the dataset is
relatively short, high-tech capital and energy consumption intensities, which reflect
the nature of industry production and the industry-specific technological level, are
45 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks * represent statistical significance at 1
percent.
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unlikely to be fluctuated over time and therefore could be treated as exogenously
given.
I estimate the two regressions using itGenO and itInterO , called Model 1 and
Model 2, respectively.
Long-Run Estimation
For the long-run regression, I use mean values across the time dimension. These
cross-sectional estimates can be interpreted as “long-run” effects. These
interpretations are based on well-established studies on the estimation of short-run
and long-run effects in a static panel model. 46 Accordingly, I will drop the time
subscript, t, in (61), and the parameters are estimated at mean values of all the
variables as follows:
    ln ln H i Li ii i i i i i
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As before, I estimate the two regressions using iGenO and iInterO , called
Model 3 and Model 4, respectively. Furthermore, the outsourcing variables in two-
step IV estimations are instrumented by the average unit production and non-
production labor cost, the ratio of high-tech capital to total capital, and capacity
utilization, as in the short-run estimations.
It could also be argued that, due to the different sizes of the industries, the
stochastic error term i is likely to be heteroskedastic, thereby conveying a biased
estimator of 2 under the standard non-linear least square. To tackle this problem,
Models 1-4 will be estimated by utilizing heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
46 See Baltagi (2001) and Pirotte (1999).
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2.5 Empirical Results and Analyses
My estimation strategy comprises two parts. First, I perform the short-run and long-
run analyses based on the CES production function, and then the corresponding
elasticities of the marginal value added of skilled and unskilled workers will be
calculated and analyzed. I then try to link the productivity impacts of outsourcing on
wage inequality by using equation (60). Without restrictions on parameters across
equations, the non-linear regressions for all specifications in both the short run and
the long run are performed by using zero as the starting value of parameter estimates
except for 1r and 5.0 .47
Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates of short-run models.
Dependent Variable: ln(Value added)
Model 1 ( Gen ) Model 2 ( Inter )
Parameters Fixed Effect IV Fixed Effect IV
 -5.9475(2.135)*** -18.3872(9.12)** -4.9164(3.59) -5.1697(6.365)
 -23.4518(4.704)*** -42.0244 (20.20)** -37.0467(6.75)*** -85.7194(41.24)*
r .9777(.012)*** 1.0117(.013)*** .9673(.013)*** .9521(.015)***
 0.0858(.016)*** 0.0435(.020)** 0.1069(.039)*** 0.0993(.062)
H
34.5244(5.853)*** 61.7217(25.83)** 55.7848(9.372)*** 139.9588(61.27)**
L
16.5745(4.816)*** 25.9667(13.33)* 45.4241(11.745)*** 96.9162(46.86)**
No. Obs. 1,268 1,268 1,268 1,268
Adjusted R-squared 0.8529 0.8549 0.8166 0.8059
LR Test 1(p-value) 95.72(.000)*** 74.27(.000)*** 6.36(.011)** 14.74(.000)***
LR Test 2(p-value) 3.52(.061)* 0.95(.3292) 6.07(.014)** 11.56(.001)***
LR Test 3(p-value) 332.61(.000)*** 385.57(.000)*** 129.95(.000)*** 121.30(.000)***
Note: 1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 2) * Statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 3)
** Statistically significant at a 5 percent level. 3) *** Statistically significant at a 1 percent level. 4)
Likelihood Ratio Test 1 is based on the null hypothesis that LH   . 5) Likelihood Ratio Test 2 is
based on the null hypothesis that the technology is characterized by CRTS. 6) Likelihood Ratio Test 3
is based on the null hypothesis that the elasticities of substitution are unity. 7) The LR statistic is
distributed as a chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
2.5.1 The Impacts of Outsourcing on Labor Productivity
47 With these starting values, the exceptional convergence property is obtained. Still, the results are
robust to a variation of starting values.
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Table 2.3 presents the short-run results of the CES specification based on
Model 1 and Model 2, in which the indexes of outsourcing refer to general
outsourcing ( Gen ) and international outsourcing ( Inter ), respectively.
First, the parameter of technology level ( ) exhibits negative values, and the
neutral technological shift ( ) is also negative and statistically significant at a 10
percent level of significance when both the general and international outsourcing
indexes are employed. In particular, the negative effect of the neutral technological
shift may be explained by the presence of the incomplete contract. When the firms
contract out their production activities at arm’s length, the cost of customizing inputs
are likely to increase, thereby undermining the overall firms’ productivities. The roles
of the incomplete contract in characterizing the outsourcing equilibrium have been
examined by a number of recent literatures, e.g. Grossman and Helpman (2005)
among others.
Secondly, the elasticities of substitution ( 1)1(   ) are equal to 1.046 in
the case of general outsourcing, compared with 1.11 in the case of international
outsourcing.48 The elasticities of substitution between capital and labor seem larger
when the index of international outsourcing is applied.49 In light of this, I also perform
the Likelihood Ratio Test (LR Test 3) under the null hypothesis that the CES
specification is characterized by unit elasticities of substitution.50 My results for the
LR Test 3 show that the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 1 percent level of
significance across all specifications. Since my result rejects the null hypothesis and
48 The elasticities of substitution are calculated from the results of two-step IV estimations in Models 1
and 2. If the results from fixed effect estimations are employed, they will be equal to 1.094 and 1.12 for
general and international outsourcing, respectively.
49 The well-behaved production function requires that the parameter  is less than unity.
50 Since it can be shown that the elasticities of substitution under the Cobb-Douglas value-added
function must be equal to unity, in so doing the abovementioned null hypothesis is equivalent to
specifying a negligible value of  (=0.0001).
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therefore is in favor of the more generalized CES specification, it inevitably casts
doubts on the appropriateness of the Cobb-Douglas functional forms, which confine
elasticities of substitution only to unity and are typically assumed when the
relationship between outsourcing and labor productivity is of researchers’ interest.
Thirdly, technology is characterized by constant returns to scale ( r = 1.011672
for two-step IV estimations) when general outsourcing is utilized, and its endogeneity
is taken into account. 51 Moreover, when international outsourcing is applied,
technology for which the returns to scale (RTS) are decreasing also holds (r = .9629
and .9673 for pooled and fixed estimations, respectively). The latter result, based on
the international outsourcing index, is consistent with Egger and Egger (2006).
Intuitively, the extent to which the technology of firms exhibits decreasing RTS in the
short run may be explained by the presence of adjustment costs of capital and labor
market frictions, such as labor hoarding, labor unions, and so forth. Due to
imperfections of this kind, firms may be unable, in the short run, to fully adjust
factors of production, that is, capital and labor, to meet production demands, and
therefore they will choose to over-utilize these factors. In light of this, LR Test 2 is
calculated based on the null hypothesis that technology is characterized by constant
returns to scale (CRTS). Apparently, under two-step IV estimation, when the general
outsourcing index is utilized, the aforementioned hypothesis cannot be rejected,
whereas when using the international outsourcing index, it was rejected with a 1
percent level of significance across all estimations.
Last and most importantly, both measures of outsourcing consistently confirm
that outsourcing has a significant and positive impact on the non-neutral
51 Nevertheless, for the fixed effect estimation, the results are in favor of decreasing RTS, and the
hypothesis that technology is characterized by CRTS (LR Test 2) is rejected with a 10 percent level of
significance.
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technological effects of both skilled ( H ) and unskilled ( L ) workers, and is skill-
biased LH  ( ). LR Test 1 is based on the null hypothesis that outsourcing affects
skilled- and unskilled-augmenting technological improvement identically
( ): LHoH   . I find that it is statistically rejected at a 1 percent level of
significance for general outsourcing and at a 5 percent level of significance for
international outsourcing. The intuition for positive unskilled- and skilled-augmenting
effects of general and international outsourcing may suggest that, in fact, labor-
augmenting outsourcing does prevail regardless of its locations. This may shed light
on the fact that, contrary to most studies, which regard the notion of outsourcing as
imported intermediate inputs, the general outsourcing – that is, the domestic
outsourcing – index might also be important to explain the wage inequality.52
Intuitively, the labor-augmenting effects might be explained by the gains from
specialization in core-competent activities (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002). These
gains emanate from the fact that when a firm contracts out some less competent
activities at arm’s length to more specialized intermediate-inputs partners, it can
relocate labor resources to some particular core-competent production activities,
thereby improving the productivity of workers. Furthermore, the skill-biased
productivity effects of general and international outsourcing may imply that US
manufacturers are likely to outsource unskilled-intensive activities and perform
skilled-intensive ones in-house. Therefore, the gains from specialization in the
remaining skilled-intensive ones are more pronounced for skilled workers. The bias
of outsourcing, in contrast, is a particularly useful result to explain the well-
52 The notion of outsourcing referring to imported intermediate inputs is first explored by Feenstra and
Hanson (1996). In contrast, the aggregated definition including both domestic and international
outsourcing is according to Abraham and Taylor (1996).
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established fact that the notion of outsourcing can more or less explain the
phenomenon of skilled wage inequality in most industrialized economies.
Table 2.4: Parameter Estimates of long-run models.
Dependent Variable: ln(Value added)
Model 3 ( Gen ) Model 4 ( Inter )
Parameters Non-linear LS IV Non-linear LS IV
 -7.5324(4.103)* -41.5121(22.495)* -4.8222(6.425) -4.8516(13.38)
 -24.5503(8.315)*** -78.5870(44.605)* -36.357(12.11)*** -66.1725(57.697)
r .9817(.023)*** 1.0031(.025)*** .9716(.025)*** .9675(.028)***
 0.0756(.024)*** 0.0207(.010)** 0.1068(.069) 0.1025(.135)
H
36.6341(10.34)*** 113.6803(56.188)** 56.145(17.017)*** 108.3935(91.86)
L
16.4138(8.628)* 47.1627(38.343) 42.9939(22.870)* 69.5043(64.281)
No. Obs. 322 322 322 322
Adjusted R-squared 0.8584 0.8584 0.8173 0.8005
LR Test 1(p-value) 32.43(.000)*** 19.68(.000)*** 2.34(.126) 3.87(.049)**
LR Test 2(p-value) 0.63(.426) .02(.8951) 1.19(.276) 1.29(.255)
LR Test 3(p-value) 83.01(.000)*** 92.04(.000)*** 30.26(.000)*** 23.76(.000)***
Note: 1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 2) * Statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 3)
** Statistically significant at a 5 percent level. 3) *** Statistically significant at a 1 percent level. 4)
The LR Test 1 is based on the null hypothesis that LH   . 5) The LR Test 2 is based on the null
hypothesis that the technology is characterized by CRTS. 6) Likelihood Ratio Test 3 is based on the
null hypothesis that the elasticities of substitution are unity. 7) The LR statistic is distributed as a chi-
squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom. 8) Instrumental variable regression assuming the
indexes of outsourcing to be endogenous and using the following instruments: average units production
and non-production labor costs, the ratio of high-tech capital to total capital, and capacity utilization
proxied by the ratio of energy consumption to total production cost. All instruments are statistically
significant at a 5 percent level of significance.
In Table 2.4, the cross-sectional estimators estimate the long-run effect in
static panel models.
Model 3 and Model 4 are based on the indexes of general outsourcing and
international outsourcing, respectively, and are estimated by employing the standard
non-linear least squares and the two-step non-linear IV estimations to account for the
potential endogeneity problem of outsourcing indexes. As mentioned in the previous
section, the outsourcing proxies are instrumented by the following instrumental
variables: average unit costs of production and non-production labor, the ratio of
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high-tech capital to total capital, and capacity utilization.53 From a comparison of
short-run parameter estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 (Table 3), I find the following
main comparisons.
First, the long-run estimations for economies of scale show CRTS; that is, the
values of r are closer to unity. Furthermore, the LR Test 2, the null hypothesis of
which is 1: rH o , is accepted in all specifications.54 This might be explained by the
fact that, although firms may deviate from constant-scale economies in the short run,
the short-run deviations can be adjusted to CRTS, as those imperfections in markets
for factors of production are dissipated in the long run. Differently put, this result may
imply that firms, at least in the long run, can fully adjust factors of production to meet
constant-scale economies despite the adjustment cost of capital and labor market
frictions in the short run. Another possibility is that in the long run, firms are able to
outsource the capital-intensive production activities to foreign economies, thereby
adjusting the scale economies via foreign direct investment.
The above results of decreasing RTS in the short run together with the
characterization of CRTS in the long run, when employing the international
outsourcing index, may imply that the assumption of CRTS technology
conventionally imposed on the short-run cost function in order to estimate the impacts
of international outsourcing on the relative demand for skilled workers is not suitable.
The dual approach, in which the short-run cost function is empirically estimated based
on the assumption that the underlying technology is characterized by CRTS, is widely
employed in a number of studies, such as Anderton and Brenton (1999) and
Geishecker (2002), among others. Provided that the short-run production function is
53 In the first step regression, all the abovementioned instruments are statistically significant at a 5
percent level of significance.
54 LR statistics (LR Test 2), which are distributed as a chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of
freedom, are statistically insignificant across all specifications.
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in fact separated from CRTS, such an assumption will bring about biased parameter
estimates.
Second, the parameter estimates, though identical to the short-run results,
seem statistically less significant in the long run than in the short run, especially when
two-step IV estimations are carried out.55 Relative to those of NLS, the neutral and
non-neutral productivity shifts under two-step IV estimations are magnified. Despite
this, my results regarding the impacts of outsourcing on labor productivity and wage
inequality are qualitatively unchanged.
Third, the elasticities of substitution ( ) are in the long run equal to 1.021
and 1.114 for two-step IV estimations in Models 3 and 4, respectively.56 My results
suggest that the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology, invoked in various studies
on the productivity impacts of outsourcing, may not be appealing either for short-run
or for long-run analyses. To be more concrete, the null hypothesis that the Cobb-
Douglas functional form is nested in a CES specification under LR Test 3, as in the
short-run results, is rejected at a 1 percent level of significance across all
specifications. Given that the true value-added function takes a CES functional form,
the conventional approach to the productivity impacts of outsourcing that simply
assumes the Cobb-Douglas function may yield inconsistent parameter estimates.57
Lastly, the positive labor-augmenting effects and skill-biased effects of
general and international outsourcing are strikingly robust across all long-run
estimations. Specifically, the parameters H and L are positive and statistically
55 Parameter estimates under non-linear least squares (NLS) are statistically significant at at a 10
percent level of significance. Under two-step IV estimation, though parameter estimates in Model 3 of
general outsourcing are statistically significant at a 5 percent level of significance, except for L , they
seem statistically insignificant in Model 4 of international outsourcing.
56 I choose to report results corresponding to two-step IV estimation as it takes into account potential
endogeneity problem and therefore may convey more consistent parameter estimates. Nonetheless, the
main implications do not change when the results of NLS are calculated.
57 Log-linearized specification of empirical models derived from the Cobb-Douglas technology is
widely used by a number of studies (see Amiti and Wei, 2006, for instance).
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significant at a 10 percent level of significance for most specifications, and LH  
is consistently observed and statistically confirmed by the significance of LR Test 1.58
My short-run and long-run results, therefore, infer that labor-augmenting gains from
specialization when firms contract out some unproductive activities at arm’s length,
and skill-biased effects of outsourcing do prevail in both the short run and the long
run. Given a perfectly competitive labor market, the latter results suggest that general
and international outsourcing can explain the widened wage inequality in both the
short run and the long run.59
Table 2.5: The elasticities of the productivity impacts of general outsourcing.
Industry Short Run Long Run
L H LO H
Food Manufacturing 5.6391 6.9479 7.1496 8.3079
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 5.8364 7.1517 7.3931 8.5572
Textile Mills 3.7737 4.9495 4.1892 5.2298
Textile Product Mills 4.1276 5.3163 4.6362 5.6883
Clothing Manufacturing 2.6869 3.7517 2.3036 3.2461
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 3.3930 4.5204 3.4401 4.4378
Wood Product Manufacturing 3.8363 5.0126 4.2518 5.2929
Paper Manufacturing 4.5279 5.7632 5.4107 6.5039
Printing and Related Support Activities -0.3385 0.4261 -2.1551 -1.4785
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 6.9101 8.3198 9.3536 10.6012
Chemical Manufacturing 5.1817 6.4522 6.3471 7.4716
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 3.8481 5.0262 4.2751 5.3178
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 1.9921 3.0217 1.3949 2.3061
Primary Metal Manufacturing 4.6067 5.8453 5.5181 6.6144
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 2.2066 3.2403 1.6257 2.5406
Machinery Manufacturing 2.7329 3.8038 2.3805 3.3282
Computer and Electronic Product 2.4788 3.5327 2.0134 2.9461
Electrical Equipment and Components 3.5072 4.6730 3.8436 4.8754
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3.9847 5.1749 4.5029 5.5563
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 2.3326 3.3833 1.8631 2.7930
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1.7733 2.7598 0.9051 1.7782
All Industries 3.4338 4.5765 3.5906 4.6020
Note: All elasticities are evaluated at mean values.
58 As shown in Table 2.4, LR Test 1 rejects the null hypothesis H L  with a 5 percent level of
significance except for the NLS result in Model 4.
59 Therefore, my results are consistent with the well-established results that an increasing relative wage
of skilled workers within industries can be explained by the notion of outsourcing. The long-run
interpretations have been explored by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) and Hsieh and Woo (2005),
and the short-run results are confirmed by Anderton and Brenton (1999), Geishecker (2002), and Amiti
and Wei (2006).
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Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 (shown later) are central to my analyses of the labor
productivity impacts of outsourcing. By using (57) and (58) and the estimated values
of parameters manifested earlier, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show the elasticities of
marginal value added of unskilled and skilled labor with respect to general
outsourcing and international outsourcing, respectively. Note that all elasticities are
evaluated at mean values of the variables.60
Note also that I use two-step IV estimates in Models 1-4 to calculate the
relevant elasticities elaborated in the previous section. The reason why I utilize two-
step IV results in Models 1-2 is that not only does it take into account the potential
endogeneity problem, thereby conveying more consistent parameter estimates, but it
also accounts for industry- and time-specific effects as does fixed-effect ones. In
addition, estimates from two-step IV estimation under Model 3 are employed despite
their statistical insignificance in that it accounts for the endogeneity problem
embedded in outsourcing indexes. Nevertheless, my essential analyses are invariant of
the econometric techniques chosen.
According to Table 2.5, calculated from the IV results in Models 1 and 3, I
observe that, both in the short run and in the long run, general outsourcing brings
about unskilled and skilled productivity improvements, and is skill-biased in the sense
that productivity gains from general outsourcing are more pronounced for skilled
workers. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the general outsourcing index entails
3.43 and 4.57 percent increases in the marginal value added of unskilled and skilled
workers, respectively, in the short run. In the long run, positive productivity gains of
this nature are slightly intensified to 3.59 and 4.6 percent increases in the marginal
value added of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.
60 The natural interpretation of the elasticities of marginal value added of unskilled and skilled workers
with respect to outsourcing indexes evaluated at mean variable values is the marginal effects of
outsourcing on a representative firm.
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It will be recalled that in (57) and (58), I mention three productivity effects of
outsourcing: factor-productivity effect, technology effect, and value-added effect. The
estimation results tell us that the total productivity gain of general outsourcing
emanates mainly from the fact that positive factor productivity ( )0, LH  and
value-added effects ( 0
V ) dominate the negative technology effect ( )0 . I also
observe a skill-biased effect of general outsourcing. This result is solely due to
H L  in my estimation. Note that, in comparison with (57), the elasticity in (58)
differs only by the size of H in the direct term. So, the skill-biased effect of general
outsourcing ( )

 LH  stems solely from the skill-biased factor-augmenting effect
of general outsourcing ( H L  ).
My results show that general outsourcing is the most beneficial for labor
productivity in food, beverage, petroleum, coal, and chemical manufacturing, whereas
the reverse effect is observed in printing and related support activities. These results
are somewhat consistent with Girma and Görg (2004) in the sense that, without
separating skilled and unskilled productivity effects, the impacts of general
outsourcing are rather mixed. They find that it has positive impacts on the chemical
and engineering sectors, but not on the electronics sector. I show that, by segregating
the impacts on skilled and unskilled labor, positive effects are mostly observed and
depend crucially on the productivity trade-off in terms of factor productivity and
value-added gains at the expense of technology loss.
Table 2.6 reveals the short-run and long-run elasticities of the marginal value
added of unskilled and skilled labor with respect to international outsourcing
calculated from the IV results in Models 2 and 4, respectively. Interestingly, the
impacts of international outsourcing on the marginal value added of unskilled and
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skilled workers are dynamically different from those of general outsourcing. Even
though international outsourcing in general brings about labor productivity gains in
both the short run and the long run, this positive impact seems to die out over time.
Specifically, in the short run, a 1 percent increase in international outsourcing brings
about 0.633 and 1.006 percent improvements in unskilled- and skilled-labor
productivity, respectively, whereas in the long run, 0.117 and 0.465 percent
productivity gains can be expected from them.
Table 2.6: The elasticities of the productivity impacts of international outsourcing.
Industry Short Run Long Run
L H LO H
Food Manufacturing -0.2178 -0.0964 -0.2392 -0.1259
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing -0.2511 -0.1287 -0.2653 -0.1511
Textile Mills -0.1856 -0.1060 -0.1825 -0.1082
Textile Product Mills -0.1553 -0.0748 -0.1583 -0.0832
Clothing Manufacturing -0.0942 0.0533 -0.1628 -0.0252
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing -0.1033 0.0529 -0.1789 -0.0332
Wood Product Manufacturing -0.0740 -0.0509 -0.0651 -0.0436
Paper Manufacturing -0.1652 -0.1136 -0.1494 -0.1012
Printing and Related Support Activities -0.1675 -0.0982 -0.1606 -0.0960
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing -0.2756 -0.2004 -0.2500 -0.1797
Chemical Manufacturing 11.0613 12.4408 7.9380 9.2247
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing -0.1562 0.0269 -0.2520 -0.0812
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing -0.0349 0.2077 -0.2300 -0.0037
Primary Metal Manufacturing -0.2273 -0.1220 -0.2338 -0.1356
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing -0.0378 0.1746 -0.1896 0.0085
Machinery Manufacturing 0.4707 0.7973 0.0665 0.3711
Computer and Electronic Product 6.939 7.9481 4.5819 5.5236
Electrical Equipment and Components 2.0223 2.5973 0.8921 1.4284
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing -0.1203 0.0963 -0.2641 -0.0621
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing -0.0762 -0.0525 -0.0670 -0.0448
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -0.1494 0.0070 -0.2154 -0.0695
All Industries 0.6328 1.0060 0.1165 0.4646
Note: All elasticities are evaluated at mean values.
First, let us examine the short-run case. I observe a smaller productivity
elasticity of both low- and high-skilled workers with respect to international
outsourcing relative to that of general outsourcing. By comparing parameter estimates
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from Model 1 of general outsourcing, the neutral and non-neutral technological shifts
of international outsourcing under Model 2 seem magnified. With unchanged signs of
parameters, the fact that factor productivity and value-added effects are positive while
the technology effect is negative still holds. Therefore, by evaluating at mean values,
the positive productivity effects of international outsourcing in the short run imply
that the former still dominates the latter. Interestingly, the short-run productivity
impact of international outsourcing seems to be in favor of labor employed merely in
high-tech industries, specifically, chemicals, and computer and electronic product
manufacturers.
Second, in the case of the long run, I observe the smaller and positive
productivity elasticity of both low- and high-skilled workers with respect to
international outsourcing, in comparison with general outsourcing, for overall US
manufacturing. The main reason for the positive values is the fact that positive factor
productivity and value-added effects are more pronounced than the negative value
added in the long run. In the long run, the results are more obvious when looking at
individual industries in the sense that both positive and negative signs are observed.
In fact, long-run productivity gains for workers do not prevail in all industries; only
high-tech industries, including chemicals, machinery, computers and electronics, and
electrical equipment and component manufacturers gain from a long-term labor
productivity improvement by internationally sourcing intermediate materials.
The above results seem to be consistent with those of Siegel and Grilliches
(1991) and Egger and Egger (2006) as far as international outsourcing is concerned.
The results turn out to be particularly important for linking the relationships among
outsourcing, labor productivity, and wage inequality for skilled and unskilled workers.
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2.5.2 The Impacts of Outsourcing on Wage Inequality
Aside from the productivity impacts of outsourcing, the role of outsourcing in
explaining the wage inequality in the US manufacturing sector is of interest in that
my results reveal that general and international outsourcing is skill-biased ( LH   ).
Given the extensive discussions on the relationship between globalization and wage
inequality, the impacts of general and international outsourcing on wage inequality
can be inferred by using (60). The elasticities of wage inequality, as before, are
evaluated at mean values.
Table 2.7: The short-run and long-run impacts of general and international
outsourcing on wage inequality.
Industry Gen Inter
S-R
w L-R w S-R w L-R w
Food Manufacturing 1.3088 1.1583 0.1214 0.1133
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 1.3153 1.1641 0.1224 0.1142
Textile Mills 1.1757 1.0406 0.0796 0.0743
Textile Product Mills 1.1887 1.0521 0.0805 0.0751
Clothing Manufacturing 1.0648 0.9424 0.1475 0.1376
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 1.1274 0.9977 0.1562 0.1457
Wood Product Manufacturing 1.1763 1.0411 0.0231 0.0215
Paper Manufacturing 1.2353 1.0933 0.0516 0.0482
Printing and Related Support Activities 0.7646 0.6767 0.0693 0.0646
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 1.4096 1.2476 0.0752 0.0702
Chemical Manufacturing 1.2705 1.1245 1.3795 1.2868
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 1.1781 1.0427 0.1831 0.1708
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 1.0296 0.9112 0.2427 0.2263
Primary Metal Manufacturing 1.2387 1.0963 0.1053 0.0982
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 1.0337 0.9149 0.2124 0.1981
Machinery Manufacturing 1.0708 0.9477 0.3265 0.3046
Computer and Electronic Product 1.0539 0.9327 1.0095 0.9417
Electrical Equipment and Components 1.1658 1.0318 0.5750 0.5363
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 1.1902 1.0534 0.2166 0.2020
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 1.0508 0.9300 0.0237 0.0222
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.9865 0.8731 0.1564 0.1458
All Industries 1.1428 1.0114 0.3732 0.3481
Note: All elasticities are evaluated at mean values.
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Table 2.7 shows the short-run and long-run impacts of general and
international outsourcing on wage inequality based on CES results, by evaluating
elasticities of wage inequality with respect to the indexes of outsourcing. Since my
results for skill-biased general and international outsourcing ( LH   ) are strikingly
robust, I can observe that both general and international outsourcing entails wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. However, I can see that, both in the
short run and in the long run, the wage inequality are more affected by general
outsourcing than by international outsourcing. According to Table 2.7, in the short
run, a 1 percent increase in general and international outsourcing leads to 1.14 and
0.37 percent increases in wage inequality, respectively. Meanwhile, in the long run,
on average, a 1 percent increase in general and international outsourcing entails 1.01
and 0.348 percent increases in the wage gap, respectively. The impacts of general and
international outsourcing on wage inequality seem to die out over time (from 1.14 to
1.01 for general outsourcing and from 0.37 to 0.348 for international outsourcing).
Intuitively, this might be interpreted as the fact that, in the face of outsourcing
opportunities, unskilled and skilled workers are more substitutable over time.
In other words, the elasticities of wage inequality with respect to outsourcing
tell us that international outsourcing can explain the widely observed phenomenon of
increased wage differentials in most industrialized economies. My results provide
another insight into the role of domestic outsourcing. Compared with the
conventional argument based on trade-related aspects of international outsourcing –
that is, imports of unskilled intensive intermediate inputs reduce the relative demand
for unskilled workers – my results shed further light on the skill-biased effect of both
general and international outsourcing in explaining wage differentials. In this sense, I
find that general outsourcing has a more intensified impact on wage inequality.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has investigated the role of general and international outsourcing in the
productivity and wage gaps of skilled and unskilled workers in US manufacturing. I
have estimated a nested CES value-added function using six-digit NAICS US
manufacturing industries during 2002-2005. The main findings are as follows.
First, both general and international outsourcing activities have a skill-biased
impact on labor productivity. However, the skill-biased impact of general outsourcing
is larger than that of international outsourcing. Second, the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled labor, defined as their marginal productivity gap, can be better
explained by general outsourcing than by international outsourcing. This implies that
the wage inequality of US manufacturing industries during 2002-2005 is mainly due
to the skill-biased labor productivity effect of general outsourcing rather than that of
international outsourcing. Third, I find that the CRTS property of the production
function holds only in the long run, whereas the unit elasticity of substitution property
seems to be an inappropriate assumption for both short-run and long-run analyses.
Since these properties of the production function are presumed when the dual
approach of short-run estimations in examining the impact of outsourcing on the labor




OUTSOURCING TYPES, RELATIVE WAGES, AND THE DEMAND FOR
SKILLED WORKERS: THE NEW EVIDENCE FROM US
MANUFACTURING
3.1 Introduction
The pivotal roles of international outsourcing and skill-biased technology in
explaining the dramatic increase in relative wages of skilled workers in industrialized
economies have been extensively documented and analyzed in the literature.61 In this
literature, the notion of outsourcing is typically confined mainly to the imported
intermediate inputs. For analytical purposes, using imported intermediate inputs can
be justified, given that imports of intermediate inputs should be expected to affect the
relative demand for manufacturing workers and relative wages,62 nevertheless, some
important insights into the role of different types of outsourcing cannot be sufficiently
emphasized.
In principle, firms differ in the extent of their specialization in activities along
the vertical chain of production. Some firms may engage in many activities along the
chain, extending from upstream (intermediate inputs) production to downstream (final
goods) production, while some other firms may specialize either in upstream or
downstream production. The upstream production of intermediate inputs may involve
an intensity of skills different from that of the downstream production of final goods.
Firms that specialize in downstream production may outsource their upstream
materials, while firms that specialize in upstream production outsource their
downstream materials. Both types of firm may also outsource their services, for
61 See, for instance, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) for US, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico,
Anderton and Brenton (1999) for the UK, Geishecker (2002) for Germany, and Hsieh and Woo (2005)
for Hong Kong.
62 Note that it is generally accepted that changes in the labor supply fail to account for this phenomenon.
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example, repair and maintenance services for machinery, communication services,
financial services, and IT services, in order to focus on their core activities. 63 If
upstream production is more skill-intensive, outsourcing downstream production can
reduce their dependency on unskilled workers and hire more skilled workers to take
advantage of the increasing productivity of the upstream activities driven by
specialization. Given this difference in skill intensity along production chain, the
negative impacts on the relative skilled labor demand would likewise be expected if
they outsource upstream production. Obviously, types of outsourcing that are different
may have different impacts on both the demand for skilled-workers and on relative
wages. Therefore, focusing on the various types of outsourcing activities should
enable us to get richer results. To the best of my knowledge, these refined notions of
outsourcing have largely been unexplored in the literature.
A study by Amiti and Wei (2006) is perhaps the closest to that in this chapter.
Their paper analyzes the impacts of both material and service outsourcing on overall
labor productivity. They argue that, by engaging in material and service outsourcing,
firms can delegate parts of the production process that are inefficient to other, more
efficient firms. They can then focus on those activities in which they have
comparative advantage and increase output. Consequently, the average productivity of
the remaining workers should increase. It should be noted, however, that Amiti and
Wei (2006) only look at aggregate workers; they do not really examine the impact of
outsourcing activities on the demand for skilled workers relative to that for unskilled
workers. Furthermore, in contrast with this study, they do not really decompose
material outsourcing any further. My approach, which further separates material
63 The above decomposition of outsourcing into three different types is consistent with the definition of
outsourcing put forward by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005). They basically define outsourcing as
the extent to which the production materials, parts, or service activities are contracted out to outside
partners.
77
outsourcing into upstream and downstream material outsourcing, allows us to capture
the notion of the vertical specialization of firms along different stages of the
production process and to examine the impacts of this vertical specialization on the
labor market.
My empirical estimations are based on the disaggregated six-digit NAICS US
data on manufacturing industries (sectors 31-33). To investigate the more detailed
impacts of outsourcing, I combine two datasets. The first is the 2002 Annual Survey of
Manufacturers, which contains six-digit NAICS data on US manufacturing, such as
estimates for employment, plant hours, payrolls, value added by manufacturers,
capital expenditures, and cost of materials for most manufacturing industries. The
second dataset is the 2002 Economic Census, which contains detailed data on
production structures and costs, and also on downstream and upstream material and
service outsourcing. In addition to these two data sources, I use the US International
Trade Statistics, provided by the US Census Bureau, for the data on imports.
My empirical strategy is to estimate the relative demand for skilled workers
derived from a modified version of the translog cost function pioneered by Brown and
Christensen (1981). My results show that upstream material outsourcing is not skill-
biased, whereas downstream material and service outsourcing is skill-biased. My
results thus partly contrast with conventional findings, which assert that outsourcing is
always skill-biased.
The intuitions behind my results can be explained as follows. Downstream
material- and service-outsourcing activities enable skill-intensive firms to reallocate
their resources to the upstream production activities, which are skill-intensive. The
productivity of skilled workers engaged in the upstream production activities will then
be enhanced. Accordingly, these kinds of outsourcing activities should have a positive
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impact on the relative wages of skilled workers. Upstream material-outsourcing
activities, on the other hand, have an opposite impact. They enable firms to specialize
in those downstream production activities which are not skill-intensive, thereby
having a negative impact on the relative wages of skilled workers.
I also report two further interesting results. First, I find that, when
disaggregating capital into machinery and buildings, the former is a substitute for, and
the latter a complement of, skilled workers. This is partly in contrast with the existing
empirical evidence, which shows capital stocks and skilled workers as complements.64
Second, I also show that technological progress is skill-biased.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the existing
empirical results on the impact of outsourcing activities on the relative demand for
skilled workers. Section 3.3 discusses my empirical model and its derivation, together
with my empirical strategy. Section 3.4 gives detailed descriptions of my data and
data measurement. Section 3.5 presents my empirical results, and Section 3.6 offers
some conclusions.
3.2 Overview of the Related Literature
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US economy witnessed a widening gap between
skilled and unskilled wages. Various theoretical propositions have been put forward to
explain this phenomenon. Trade economists, for instance, have argued that the gap
can be attributed to international trade in intermediate goods, or “outsourcing” as it is
often referred to in the literature. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) were the first to
empirically verify this outsourcing-based theoretical proposition. They show that
around 15-33 percent of the relative increase in wages of skilled workers can indeed
64 See Geishecker (2002), Anderton and Brenton (1999), and Feenstra and Hanson (1997).
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be explained by international outsourcing. Later, Feenstra and Hanson (1999), using
imported intermediate inputs, revealed that skill-biased technological change can also
significantly explain the observation. Subsequent to the publication of these two
seminal papers, many authors have replicated these results using data from other
industrialized countries, such as the UK, Germany, and Hong Kong, and have found
supporting evidence.65
More recently, some papers have shed further light on the issues of wage
inequality. Blum (2004), for instance, shows that a structural shift in the sectoral
composition of the economy could also explain the rising wages of, and demand for,
skilled workers. His argument is motivated by an observation that in the US, there
have been some falls in the level of employment and capital accumulation in the
manufacturing sector and, at the same time, some increases in the level of
employment and capital accumulation in the non-manufacturing sector, for example,
in services and in the retail and wholesale trade sectors. He further asserts that if
capital is complementary to skilled workers in the non-manufacturing sector, the
above sectoral shift would have caused an increase in the wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers in the economy. He empirically tested his assertion
using US data and shows that the sectoral reallocation from manufacturing to services,
retail, and wholesale trade sectors can indeed account for the increasing wage gap.
In contrast to Blum’s (2004) model, in which capital is immobile across
countries, Sachs and Schatz (1998) develop a model in which capital is allowed to
flow outside the country. They show that such a capital outflow can raise the relative
wages of skilled workers in the non-traded goods sectors. Despite the above essential
difference, both models do indeed highlight the important role of capital inputs and
65 See Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Anderton and Brenton (1999) and Hijzen et al. (2005)
for the UK, Geishecker (2002) for Germany, and Hsieh and Woo (2005) for Hong Kong.
80
structural change in explaining the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers. This chapter will also investigate the role of capital inputs empirically. In
particular, I will decompose capital inputs into two categories. The first category is
machinery and equipment, and the second is buildings and other structures. I show
that different capital inputs will have different implications for relative wages and for
demand for skilled workers.
The study of Amiti and Wei (2006) is, in content, perhaps the closest paper to
mine. They evaluate the impacts of international outsourcing, or offshoring in their
terminology, on the productivity of the US manufacturing sector. The starting point of
their paper is the twin stylized observations of increasing trends in productivity and
international outsourcing in the US in recent decades. In their framework, production
technology is determined by both material and service offshoring. They argue that if
firms are able to internationally fragment the inefficient parts of their production
process by outsourcing, they can then specialize in other parts of the production
process where they have a comparative advantage. Accordingly, the average
productivity of labor in the economy should increase. In addition to the specialization
effect, the average productivity will also increase due to a host of other effects such as
restructuring effects, learning externalities, and variety effects brought about by
offshoring. 66 Their empirical results substantiate their argument. They are able to
show that outsourcing does make a positive impact on overall labor productivity.
Unfortunately, few conclusions can be drawn about the impact of outsourcing on
wage inequality.
Interestingly, in an earlier work, Amiti and Wei (2006), using a similar
framework, found that offshoring has either a small negative effect on employment
66 A more detailed description of these effects can be found in Amiti and Wei (2006).
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when a disaggregated manufacturing sector is used, or no effect at all when a more
aggregated manufacturing sector is used. Thus, the effect of offshoring on
employment seems to be inconclusive.
The present chapter departs from Amiti and Wei (2006) by focusing
specifically on the impacts of outsourcing on the relative wages of skilled to unskilled
workers and on the demand for skilled workers, instead of on the impacts of
outsourcing on overall productivity and employment. The notion of outsourcing in my
context follows that of Abraham and Taylor (1996) in the sense that outsourcing and
in-house production are substitutes; therefore, they should affect the demand for labor
regardless of location. As such, rather than merely focusing on the trade-related
aspects of outsourcing, I take into consideration both domestic and international
outsourcing. This chapter also differs from their papers in many other respects. First, I
categorize workers as skilled or unskilled, while they view workers as one whole
group. Second, I further decompose outsourcing activities into upstream and
downstream material outsourcing and service outsourcing, while they look at
aggregate material and service outsourcing. Third, I estimate a cost share of skilled
workers using a cross-industry analysis, while they estimate a production function
using a panel data analysis. Finally, this chapter focuses on a more disaggregated
level of the manufacturing sector than theirs does.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. To the best of my
knowledge, this chapter is the first empirical investigation that looks at various types
of outsourcing activities; that is, upstream and downstream material outsourcing, and
service outsourcing. 67 Next, it produces a new empirical finding that shows that
67 It should also be noted that the present chapter also departs from Görg and Hanley (2003) in the
sense that they split sample industries into upstream and downstream industries, but I look at the
impacts of outsourcing upstream and downstream activities by manufacturing industries.
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outsourcing is not always skill-biased. Downstream material outsourcing and service
outsourcing are skill-biased, but upstream material outsourcing is not.
3.3 The Empirical Model
My empirical strategy is to estimate a relative demand for skilled workers. The most
essential structural variables in my analysis are those that capture various types of
outsourcing activities.
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The output for industry i, iY , depends on three primary factors, namely high-skilled
workers, HiL , low-skilled workers, LiL , and capital, iK . The service outsourcing,
s
iout , material outsourcing,
m
iout , and the level of production technology, iT are
assumed to enter the production function via neutral and non-neutral technological
shifts. Note that Amiti and Wei (2006) use a production function similar to that in
(65), but their variables are confined to a neutral technological shift fashion.
Furthermore, I disaggregate the labor input according to the skill attributes in order to
capture the impacts of outsourcing on the relative demand for skilled workers.
Subsequently, I derive a short-run cost function, assuming that capital stock
iK is quasi fixed, in order to take into account the extent to which it may be different
from its long-run equilibrium. Accordingly, the short-run (variable) cost function,
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The next step is to choose a functional form fitting the short-run unit cost
function (66). Following Brown and Christensen (1981), the unit cost function (66)
can be approximated by a general translog function with variable and quasi fixed
input-factors. For notational simplicity, I temporarily drop the industry subscript i.
Without loss of generality, I also impose symmetry and linear homogeneity
restrictions. Expression (66) can be further written into

2
1ln  zwc o , (67)
where  LH www lnln ,  H L    ,  ToutoutYKz
sm lnlnlnlnln ,
 K Y M S T       ,  zw  , and  is a 77 matrix of coefficients.
The crucial property of the translog function can be derived by differentiating
(67) with respect to ln , ,kw k H L . Let  ln ln , ,k k k kWS c w L w c k H L    
denote the cost share of skilled and unskilled workers in variable costs. Since skilled
and unskilled workers are the only variable factors of production, the share of both
factors must add up to unity and only one of them is linearly independent. As such, I
focus on the estimation of the skilled workers’ cost-share equation. By differentiating
(67) with respect to Hiwln , and invoking the symmetry assumption and linear
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In addition, since the linear homogeneity property of the translog function
must be satisfied, the following parameter restrictions are inevitably required:
1H L   and 0 LjHjLLLHHHHL  , (69)
where SMYKj ,,, , and T.
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It is conventionally known that the cost share is essentially an expression of
the relative demand for skilled workers, which in turn reflects not only the relative
employment but also the relative factor prices. However, I am going to modify the
above specification for the following reasons.
First, it is questionable whether the relative-wage term in (67) should be
incorporated in the estimation. This is because the dependent variable is a composite
measure of not only the relative demand for skilled workers, but also relative wages.
Hence, the relative-wage term should be excluded from the estimation of (67) since
relative wages are unlikely to be exogenous and there is a problem of a definitional
relationship between the share of skilled workers’ wage bills and the wage terms.
Furthermore, as noted by Berman, et al. (1994), the cross-industry variation in wages
provides little information, because the wage differential across industries is mainly
explained by the difference in the skill content of workers, so I do not expect high-
wage industries to economize on the high-skilled workers. As such, an estimation of
(67), with the relative-wage term included, would yield biased coefficients.
Accordingly, I drop the relative-wage term from the estimation of (67).
Second, the empirical model analogous to (67) has been prevalently employed
to explore the impacts of material outsourcing on the relative demands for skilled
workers in various economies by many studies, such as Hanson and Harrison (1999),
Anderton and Brenton (1999), Dell’mour et al. (2000), Geishecker (2002), and Hsieh
and Woo (2005). None of them, to the best of my knowledge, has actually
investigated the possibility that various types of sourced materials that are utilized in
different stages of production have different effects on the relative demand for skilled
workers. Outsourcing or contracting out some activities along the vertical chain of the
production process enables firms to specialize in other activities along the vertical
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chain where they have a comparative advantage. For instance, General Motors may
outsource activities that deal with the product design and the production of high-tech
components (upstream activities), and may specialize in car production (downstream
activity), whereas Apple may outsource the production of its iPod players (Apple’s
downstream activity), and specialize in R&D and product design (upstream activity).
Consequently, it seems unrealistic to assume that upstream outsourcing should have
the same impact on the relative demand for skilled workers as downstream
outsourcing.
Therefore, I believe that it is worthwhile to further investigate the role of
various types of outsourcing such as upstream and downstream material outsourcing
and also service outsourcing. Accordingly, miout in (68) will be further broken down
into upstream material outsourcing ( muiout ) and downstream material outsourcing
( mdiout ).
Lastly, the vector of three-digit NAICS manufacturing industry dummies ( iD )
is also introduced to control for industry-fixed effects. By adding a stochastic error
term iu with   0iuE and  
2
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In addition to the wage-share equation, I also estimate the following
employment-share equation to control for inter-industry differences in the relative
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where HiES is the share of skilled-worker employment in the total employment and
/Hi Liw w is the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers. Admittedly, as is also
noted in Anderton and Brenton (1999), the ad hoc specification of (71) is less
satisfactory from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, it should give us some
interesting insights into the impact of various types of outsourcing on the employment
of skilled workers. It should also enable us to compare my results with those obtained
in previous studies that also estimate such an employment equation, such as, Machin
et al. (1996).
Two econometric problems may arise when estimating specifications (69) and
(70), and they need to be corrected. Firstly, due to the variation in the size of the
industries in my sample, the stochastic-error term iu is likely to be heteroskedastic,
thereby producing a biased estimator of 2 in the standard ordinary least squares
(OLS) method. To tackle this problem, I employ White’s (1980) heteroskedastic-
robust standard-error procedure in the estimation of (70) and (71).
Secondly, there may be an endogeneity-bias problem in the estimation of (70)
and (71). That is, the industry-specific level of technology ( iT ), which is measured by
high-technology capital stocks such as computers and data processing equipment,
may be correlated with an unobserved variable in the error term. In order to verify
whether there is indeed such a problem, I run an Instrumental Variable (IV)
regression and apply a Hausman Test to the results. I use the rate of energy
consumption ( iENERGY ) and value added per establishment ( iVN ) as my
instruments, and express them as a logarithm. The first instrumental variable aims to
capture the industry-specific production performance. That is, the industries which
utilize high-tech capital (such as computers) intensively are likely to have lower
87
energy consumption than the industries which rely intensively on low-tech capital
(such as machinery, engines, etc). The second instrumental variable may represent the
competitiveness in the industries in the sense that highly competitive industries
should be characterized by low value added per establishment. It is likely that the
market structures should affect the choices of technology levels. The preliminary
regression shows that these instrumental variables are strongly correlated with the
industry-specific level of technology ( iT ).68




As is well known, a potential IV also needs to be exogenous. The exogeneity
of both IVs may be justifiable since in the cross-industry analysis the levels
technology and market structures are industry-specific and therefore exogenous to
each industry. This assumption, however, may not hold for the sufficiently long time
period in the panel dataset since the level of industry-specific technology may evolve
and therefore be dependent on other economic factors.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data Sources
My data are retrieved from the following data sources provided by the US Bureau of
Census: the 2002 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), the 2002 Economic Census,
and the US International Trade Statistics. The 2002 ASM provides six-digit NAICS
statistics for the manufacturing industry. The manufacturing sector (sectors 31-33) in
this survey is defined as comprising establishments that engage in the mechanical,
physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into
new products.
68 The asterisks * mean statistical significance at 1 percent. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.1: Three-digit NAICS manufacturing industry code (Sectors 31-33).
2002 NAICS Code Report Title
311 Food Manufacturing
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
313 Textile Mills
314 Textile Product Mills
315 Apparel Manufacturing
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
321 Wood Product Manufacturing
322 Paper Manufacturing
323 Printing and Related Support Activities
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
325 Chemical Manufacturing
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
333 Machinery Manufacturing
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
From this survey, I obtain data on the wages and employment of skilled and
unskilled workers across the manufacturing sector. Although this survey also
provides data on materials used in the production, unfortunately it does not provide
sufficiently detailed statistics on material and service outsourcing, or on proxies for
technology capital. As noted by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), I do not normally think
of, say, the purchase of steel by a US automobile producer as outsourcing. But it is
more common to consider the purchase of automobile parts by such a company as
outsourcing. Moreover, unlike the existing empirical studies on the impacts of
outsourcing on the relative demand for labor, there is no reason to confine the extent
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of outsourcing merely to sourcing of materials.69 I therefore supplement the above
data with the 2002 Economic Census.
From the 2002 Economic Census, I obtain detailed information on the cost
and production structure of manufacturing firms and also on their use of technological
capital (e.g. computers, data processing equipment, etc.), their purchase of
intermediate materials (e.g. components, containers, packaging, etc.), and services
(e.g. communication services; accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services;
computer services, etc.). I focus specifically on the six-digit NAICS manufacturing-
sector data (sectors 31-33).
My combined data from the 2002 ASM and the 2002 Economic Census yields
474 six-digit NAICS manufacturing industries.
3.4.2 Dependent Variables
Using both data sets, I can express the wage share of skilled workers in industry i
( HiWS ) in equation (70) as the ratio of the total wage bills of non-production workers
to the total annual payrolls. The employment share of skilled workers in industry i
( HiES ) in equation (71) is measured by the ratio of the total number of non-
production workers to the total number of workers.
3.4.3 Outsourcing
Upstream material outsourcing ( muiout ) is measured by the share of the total
production costs taken up by the costs of intermediate parts and materials employed
in the upstream production stage. The downstream material outsourcing ( )mdiout is
measured by the share of the costs of contracting-out activities, such as reprocessing,
69 For example, in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Amiti and Wei (2006), the (imported) materials are
used as proxies of “broad measures” of material outsourcing. One can argue that these measures may
be imprecise as the use of raw materials should not by definition be considered as the result of
outsourcing decisions of firms.
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repackaging, and blending, in the total production costs. The scatter plots of HiWS
against muioutln and
md
ioutln are represented in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2,
respectively. As expected, the former shows a negative relationship between muioutln
and HiWS , while the latter shows a positive correlation between
md
ioutln and HiWS .
Thus, different types of material outsourcing, that is, upstream- or downstream-
material outsourcing, should have different impacts on the relative demand for skilled
workers.
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Service outsourcing ( siout ) is measured by the share of services purchased in
the total production costs of industry i. Examples of services that are outsourced are
repair and maintenance services of machinery and equipment; communication
services; accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services; and computer and hardware
services. Figure 3.3 depicts a positive relationship between ln siout and HiWS .
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3.4.4 Control and Instrumental Variables
Capital Inputs
Similar to Geishecker (2002), I use the value of buildings and other structures
( BLDiK ), and also machinery and equipment (
MCH
iK ) in industry i, as proxies for the
total amount of capital inputs employed in industry i ( iK ). The expected sign of the
coefficient of iKln could be either negative or positive, depending on whether or not
capital inputs and high-skilled workers are substitutes.
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Figure 3.4 depicts a positive relationship between the ratio of the total value of
buildings and other structures to the total value of the assets and the wage share of
skilled workers. Figure 3.5 depicts a negative relationship between the ratio of the
total value of machinery and equipment to the total value of the assets and the wage
share of skilled workers. The relationship portrayed in Figure 3.5 is the exact opposite
of the one portrayed in Figure 3.4. It appears that machinery and equipment, and
skilled workers are substitutes. Where firms are machinery- and equipment-intensive,
their workers tend to have a lower wage share. By contrast, buildings and other
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structures, and skilled workers are complements. The skilled workers of firms that are
more buildings and other structures-intensive tend to have a higher wage share. I
should thus expect that these two types of capital input will affect the demand for
skilled workers differently.
Industrial Production
I also control for industry size using the logarithm of the total amount of sales ( iYln )
as a proxy. A larger size industry would be expected to have a larger demand for
skilled workers. This implies that the coefficient of iYln should be positive.
Industry-Specific Technology
The level of technology of an industry i ( iT ) is measured by the ratio of high-
technology capital to the total value of assets of industry i. As in Amiti and Wei
(2006), I proxy high-technology capital using the value of computers and data-
processing equipment used in industry i. HiWS and iTln , as shown in Figure 6A, are
positively related. This implies that high-technology capital and skilled workers are
complements, and thus I should expect that the regression coefficient for high-
technology capital has a positive sign.
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Import Shares
In the analysis, I also control for the impact of imports on workers’ wages and
employment. I know from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory that when domestic
production is supplanted by imports, a substitution of this kind should negatively
affect wages and employment. I thus incorporate the industrial import-share ( iIM )
variable in my regressions. This variable is proxied by the ratio of the imports of
industry i’s product (six-digit NAICS) to its total domestic consumption. The data
are retrieved from the US International Trade Statistics, US Bureau of Census.
Instrumental Variables
As mentioned previously, I run IV regressions with a heteroskedasticity-robust
variance estimator using the rate of energy consumption ( iENERGY ) and value added
per establishment ( iVN ) as my instruments for the level of technology ( iT ). The
former is measured by the ratio of electricity and fuel consumption used in production
to the total capital expenditure, and the latter is the ratio of the total industry value
added to the total number of establishments.
Statistics summarizing all the variables elaborated above and the matrix of
correlations among these variables are presented in Table 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HiWS 473 0.3987 0.1287 0.1077 0.8093
HiES 473 0.2921 0.1181 0.0871 0.7156
iKln 473 11.5768 1.4024 6.7604 15.8128
BLD
iKln 468 9.6267 1.5399 4.8442 15.0105
MCH
iKln 473 0.3987 0.1287 0.1077 0.8093
iYln 473 15.1939 1.1954 11.6991 19.0873
m
ioutln 473 -0.1590 0.2133 -3.2124 -0.0348
mu
ioutln 471 -0.1883 0.1379 -1.0087 -0.0306
md
ioutln 459 -4.1124 1.2732 -10.4188 -0.4770
s
ioutln 469 -5.0816 0.9087 -8.6866 -2.2080
iTln 468 -2.7487 0.3910 -4.0203 -1.5696
iIMln 473 -2.0171 1.3284 -13.5 -0.0104
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iYln 0.4203 0.6426 1
mu
ioutln 0.0965 0.1141 0.255 1
md
ioutln -0.0688 -0.0561 -0.1412 -0.4494 1
s
ioutln -0.0794 -0.0871 -0.1838 -0.2705 0.5024 1
iTln 0.077 0.1202 0.1629 0.0549 0.0792 0.2957 1
iIMln -0.0699 -0.1279 -0.3968 -0.2546 0.2164 0.0963 0.0292 1
3.5 Empirical Results
Tables 3.4 to Table 3.7 present my regression results. Column (1) in all tables shows
the results I obtained using a regression specification that uses aggregated capital
inputs and material outsourcing. Column (2) gives the results I obtained when the
control variable imports are excluded from the regression. Column (3) presents my
results when capital inputs were further disaggregated into buildings and other
structures ( BLDiKln ) and machinery and equipment (
MCH
iKln ). Finally, Column (4)
presents the results I obtained when material outsourcing was further decomposed
into upstream material outsourcing, muioutln , and downstream material outsourcing,
md
ioutln .70
3.5.1 The Wage Share of Skilled Workers
According to the standard Heckscher–Ohlin paradigm, imports and domestic
production are substitutes, and hence imports should affect relative wages and the
demand for skilled workers. Therefore, to take into consideration this import effect, I
also run a regression with import share ( iIMln ) as an explanatory variable. The result
of this regression is presented in Column (1). Consistent with Leamer (1998), I find
70 Since values of material outsourcing are missing for some industries, the number of observations in
the actual estimation is slightly reduced to 465 and 452 observations.
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that the import share is not significant, which suggests that international trade has no
influence on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
As revealed in Table 3.4, the coefficients of all structural variables for all
specifications are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.71 The
aggregate proxy for capital inputs (see Columns (1) and (2)) is statistically significant
and has negative sign, implying that capitals and skilled workers are substitutes. My
results are thus consistent with Geishecker’s (2002) result that shows a negative
relationship between capitals and the relative demand for skilled workers.
Table 3.4: OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimators for non-
production wage share
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
iKln -0.0705(.0126)*** -0.0691(.0121)*** ---- ----
BLD
iKln ---- ---- 0.0280(.0081)*** 0.0222(.0078)***
MCH
iKln ---- ---- -0.0955(.0117)*** -0.0984(.0117)***
iYln 0.0742(.0143)*** 0.0722(.0133)*** 0.0681(.0137)*** 0.0763(.0133)***
m
ioutln -0.1027(.0480)** -0.1034(.0483)** -0.1265(.0491)*** ----
mu
ioutln ---- ---- ---- -0.1162(.0495)**
md
ioutln ---- ---- ---- 0.0112(.0046)**
s
ioutln 0.0446(.0070)*** 0.0446(.0069)*** 0.0430(.0067)*** 0.0352(.0075)***
iTln 0.0621(.0162)** 0.0612(.0156)*** 0.0620(.0154)*** 0.0713(.0151)***
iIMln 0.0027(.0039) ---- ---- ----
Constant 0.1740(.1231) 0.1817(.1172) 0.2443(.1234)* 0.2035(.1214)*
R-squared 0.5490 0.5485 0.5778 0.5948
F statistic 24.36*** 25.30*** 27.93*** 26.84***
No. of Obs. 465 465 465 452
Note: 1) robust standard errors in parentheses, 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent, 3) **
statistically significant at 5 percent, 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent.
To see this more clearly, the capital stock is separated out into two
components, buildings and other structures ( BLDiKln ) and machinery and equipment
71 These results are also consistent with F-tests. As reported in Table 3.4, the results, based on F
statistics, assert that all coefficients are jointly statistically significant at the 5 percent level of
significance.
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( MCHiKln ) in Columns (3) and (4). I found that
BLD
iKln has a positive effect, whereas
MCH
iKln has a negative effect. My results suggest that buildings and other structures
are complementary to skilled workers, while machinery and equipment are not.
In line with Amiti and Wei (2006), the coefficients of iYln are positive and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance in all regression
specifications. This suggests that larger industries are more likely to be characterized
by a higher wage share of skilled workers. Employing skilled workers is relatively
more expensive than employing unskilled workers, and larger firms would be more
able to afford it as they can tap the benefit of the economies of scale.
The estimated coefficients of material outsourcing ( mioutln ) in Columns (1),
(2), and (3) are all negative and statistically significant at a 5 percent level of
significance. This result is in contrast to those of Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999),
Anderton and Brenton (1999), and Geishecker (2002), who all find a positive
relationship. In these papers, material outsourcing is proxied by imported
intermediate materials. The negative relationship between material outsourcing and
the wage share of skilled workers as depicted in Columns (1), (2), and (3) may be
consistent with the results of studies done by Siegel and Griliches (1991) and Egger
and Egger (2006). These show that material outsourcing leads to a short-run
deterioration in the overall productivity of labor and therefore in the efficiency of
production. If indeed there is a negative short-run effect of material outsourcing, then
I should expect a negative relationship between material outsourcing and relative
wages of skilled workers.
I further break down material outsourcing into upstream ( muioutln ) and
downstream material ( mdioutln ) outsourcing. From the results presented in Column
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(4), I can see that upstream material outsourcing negatively affects the wage share of
skilled workers, while downstream material outsourcing positively affects the wage
share of skilled workers. As elaborated previously, materials used in upstream
production stages include intermediate parts and materials, and activities involved in
downstream production stages include reprocessing and repackaging activities. The
former is often more skill-intensive than the latter. Consequently, in contrast with
performing these skill-intensive activities in-house, outsourcing them from the market
is unlikely to yield a rise in the wages paid to skilled workers in downstream
industries, and thus a negative relationship of this kind may indeed prevail. On the
other hand, contracting out downstream materials allows firms to specialize in the
production of upstream materials, therefore resulting in higher productivity and thus
higher wage shares for skilled workers. Accordingly, a positive relationship between
downstream material outsourcing and the wages of skilled workers relative to those of
unskilled workers does prevail.
I also show that service outsourcing has a positive impact on relative wages.
Service outsourcing in my context includes purchases of communication, accounting,
auditing, bookkeeping, and computer services. This result is consistent with Amiti
and Wei (2006).
The coefficients of the level of technology ( iTln ) are positive and statistically
significant at a 1 percent level of significance. This suggests that technology is skill-
biased. This result confirms the findings of previous studies such as those of
Anderton and Brenton (1999), Geishecker (2002), and Amiti and Wei (2006):
technology and skilled workers are complementary. So as I show here, higher
technology results in a larger wage share for skilled workers.
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In my regressions, I also include dummies for industries. As expected,
chemical, machinery, computer, and electronic products are relatively skill-intensive,
while textile mills, clothing, leather and allied products, and wood product
manufacturing are not.72
Table 3.5: Instrumental variable estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust variance
estimators for non-production wage share.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
iKln -0.0967(.0162)*** -0.0942(.0152)*** ---- ----
BLD
iKln ---- ---- 0.0243(.0083)*** 0.0180(.0082)**
MCH
iKln ---- ---- -0.1101(.0138)*** -0.1126(.0131)***
iYln 0.0975(.0177)*** 0.0940(.0162)*** 0.0843(.0164)*** 0.0927(.0157)***
m
ioutln -0.1420(.0529)*** -0.1432(.0533)*** -0.1537(.0533)*** ----
mu
ioutln ---- ---- ---- -0.1326(.0496)***
md
ioutln ---- ---- ---- 0.0122 (.0047)**
s
ioutln 0.0380(.0083)*** 0.0380(.0082)*** 0.0388(.0076)*** 0.0305(.0085)***
iTln 0.1350(.0302)*** 0.1330(.0293)*** 0.1108(.0274)*** 0.1188(.0257)***
iIMln 0.0047(.0043) ---- ---- ----
Constant -0.0490(.1655) -0.0345(.1566) 0.0811(.1616) 0.0458(.157)
R-squared 0.5189 0.5190 0.5641 0.5823
F statistic 22.48*** 23.19*** 26.01*** 25.39***
Hausman test
statistic(p-value)
2.32(1.00) 16.12(0.9111) 0.97(1.00) 3.01(1.00)
No. of Obs. 465 465 465 452
Note: 1) robust standard errors in parentheses, 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent, 3) **
statistically significant at 5 percent, 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent, 5) Hausman
specification test is distributed as chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of instruments under the null hypothesis that iTln is uncorrelated with the error term.
Finally, as noted by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), the estimation of the wage-
share equations might be subject to not only a potential heteroskedasticity problem,
but also an endogeneity problem, thereby resulting in inefficient and biased
estimators. More specifically, it is possible that iTln is correlated with an unobserved
variable in the error term ( iu ). To verify this, I run IV regressions and apply the
Hausman test for the endogeneity problem to the results. My null hypothesis posits
72 The results of industry dummies are suppressed.
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that iTln is not correlated with iu . The result of the Hausman test shows that the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, suggesting that there is no endogeneity problem. As
pointed out by Hausman (1978), when iTln is indeed uncorrelated with the
unobserved variable in iu , the OLS and IV estimators would essentially produce the
same qualitative results. 73 Indeed, when I compare the results from the OLS
regressions in Table 3.4 and the results from IV regressions in Table 3.5, I observe
that the explanatory variables that are significant in the OLS regressions are also
significant in IV regressions, and they all have the same predicted signs.
3.5.2. The Employment Share of Skilled Workers
Table 3.6: OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimators for non-
production employment share.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
)ln( LH ww -0.1563(.0289)*** -0.1550(.0287)*** -0.1731(.0291)*** -0.1872(.0312)***
iKln -0.0560(.0123)*** -0.0550(.0116)*** ---- ----
BLD
iKln ---- ---- 0.0255(.0076)*** 0.0208(.0074)***
MCH
iKln ---- ---- -0.0811(.0113)*** -0.0858(.0114)***
iYln 0.0613(.0135)*** 0.0601(.0125)*** 0.0579(.0128)*** 0.0666(.0125)***
m
ioutln -0.0850(.04347)* -0.0854(.0436)* -0.1051(.0447)** ----
mu
ioutln ---- ---- ---- -0.1019(.0491)**
md
ioutln ---- ---- ---- 0.0095(.0043)**
s
ioutln 0.0391(.0066)*** 0.0391(.0066)*** 0.0382(.0064)*** 0.0323(.0073)***
iTln 0.0502(.0157)*** 0.0495(.0151)*** 0.0520(.0149)*** 0.0620(.0148)***
iIMln 0.0015(.0037) ---- ---- ----
Constant 0.1708(.1139) 0.1745(.1092) 0.2409(.1160)** 0.2106(.1174)*
R-squared 0.5523 0.5521 0.5790 0.5969
F statistic 23.02*** 23.90*** 24.80*** 23.50***
No. of Obs. 465 465 465 452
Note: 1) robust standard errors in parentheses, 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent, 3) **
statistically significant at 5 percent, 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent.
In this sub-section, I discuss the results of my OLS and IV estimations of the
employment-share equation (71). They are reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7,
respectively. The result of the Hausman test for the endogeneity problem is reported
73 That is, the estimators from OLS and IV estimation should differ only by the sampling errors.
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in Table 3.7. It shows that the null hypothesis of no correlation between iTln and
iu cannot be rejected for all specifications, thus suggesting that there is no
endogeneity problem.74
I also include the relative-wage variable, ln( / )H Lw w , in the estimations and
find that the coefficients of ln( / )H Lw w have a negative sign and are statistically
significant at a 1 percent level of significance. This implies that an increase in
ln( / )H Lw w triggers a replacement of skilled workers by unskilled workers.
Table 3.7: Instrumental variable estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust variance
estimators for non-production employment share.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
)ln( LH ww -0.1860(.0319)*** -0.1826(.0310)*** -0.1913(.0303)*** -0.2042(.0324)***
iKln -0.0798(.0160)*** -0.0775(.0148)*** ---- ----
BLD
iKln ---- ---- 0.0231(.0077)*** 0.0178(.0076)**
MCH
iKln ---- ---- -0.0941(.0134)*** -0.0984(.0128)***
iYln 0.0822(.0172)*** 0.0792(.0154)*** 0.0714(.0153)*** 0.0801(.0147)***
m
ioutln -0.1143(.0478)** -0.1150(.0481)** -0.1247(.0485)** ----
mu
ioutln ---- ---- ---- -0.1132(.0494)**
md
ioutln ---- ---- ---- 0.0105(.0044)**
s
ioutln 0.0348(.0076)*** 0.0347(.0076)*** 0.0355(.0072)*** 0.0292(.0081)***
iTln 0.1100(.0296)*** 0.1078(.0283)*** 0.0897(.0262)*** 0.0990(.0249)***
iIMln 0.0035(.0041) ---- ---- ----
Constant 0.0099(.1504) 0.0203(.1424) 0.1296(.1473) 0.1028(.1460)
R-squared 0.5295 0.5301 0.5700 0.5884
F statistic 21.79*** 22.54*** 24.02*** 22.66***
Hausman spec. test
statistic(p-value)
0.09(1.00) 2.88(1.00) 1.39(1.00) 0.6(1.00)
No. of Obs. 465 465 465 452
Note: 1) robust standard errors in parentheses, 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent, 3) **
statistically significant at 5 percent, 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent, 5) Hausman
specification test is distributed as chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of instruments under the null hypothesis that iTln is uncorrelated with the error term.
I show that the independent variable, iIMln , is not significant (see Column
(1)). This suggests that the conventional H-O framework cannot really explain the
74 The coefficients of instruments in the first stage regression are statistically significant at a 1 percent
level of significance for all specifications with the adjusted R-squared ranging from 0.5766 to 0.6172.
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change in the employment share of skilled workers. I also show that capital inputs
have a negative impact on the employment share of skilled workers (see Column (2)).
When I break down capital inputs into buildings and other structures, and machinery
and equipment, I find that the former are skill-biased, while the latter are not (see
Columns (3) and (4)). Next, I also show that industry size has a positive impact on
employment share.
As with my previous results, I find that aggregate material outsourcing has a
negative impact on the relative demand for skilled workers. When I separate material
outsourcing into upstream and downstream material outsourcing, I find that the latter
has a positive impact on the relative demand for skilled workers, whereas the former
has a negative impact. I also show that service outsourcing has a positive impact on
the relative demand for skilled workers.
The coefficients of iTln are positive. This suggests that technology is skill-
biased. This is consistent with my earlier results from the estimation of the wage-
share equation. Lastly, I find that chemical, fabricated metal, machinery, computers,
and electronic products are skill intensive, while textile, clothing, leather, and wood
products are not.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I estimate the impacts of outsourcing on relative wages and the
demand for skilled workers using six-digit NAICS US manufacturing-sector data. I
break down outsourcing into three categories, namely upstream and downstream
material outsourcing, and service outsourcing. My results show that downstream
material outsourcing and service outsourcing have a positive impact on the wages of
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skilled workers relative to those of unskilled workers and the relative demand for
skilled workers, while upstream material outsourcing has the opposite impact.
The positive impact of downstream material and service outsourcing on
relative wages and the demand for skilled workers can be explained by the idea that
these types of outsourcing allow firms to specialize in the upstream production
activities, which usually employ a greater number of skilled workers. Therefore, an
increased attention to upstream production activities will naturally induce firms to
hire more skilled workers. In contrast, downstream production activities and services
tend to be less skill-intensive than upstream production activities; hence, firms that
focus more on the former do not really require numerous skilled workers.
Accordingly, their demand for skilled workers will fall.
My empirical results also shed further light on the different roles played by
different types of capital inputs. I discover that the nature of the relationship between
capital inputs and skilled workers depends on the types of capital input employed in
the production process. I find that machinery and equipment are substitutes for skilled
workers, while buildings and other structures are complementary to skilled workers.
With regard to the role of technology, I find a positive relationship between
technology and the demand for skilled workers. It can thus be concluded that
technology is skill-biased.
It may be more interesting in future research to rigorously investigate the roles
of domestic and international outsourcing as explanatory factors for wage inequalities.
Furthermore, a natural extension to my empirical analysis would be to conduct a
dynamic panel-data analysis rather than a cross-sectional analysis like that carried out
for this chapter. Such an analysis should enable us to obtain richer results.
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Unfortunately, more recent detailed six-digit NAICS manufacturing-sector data are
not available at the time of writing. I therefore leave this to my future research.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF MATERIAL AND SERVICE OUTSOURCING ON
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR SUBSTITUTION IN THAILAND’S
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
4.1 Introduction
Most of literature concerned with the economic impacts of outsourcing on the labor
market focuses mainly on developed countries. 75 Due to technical advances in
information technology and greater liberalization of trade globally, the current surge
in outsourcing activities spurs the ‘fear of job losses’ in terms of ‘exporting jobs’ to
developing countries (see Amiti and Wei, 2006). Should developing economies also
fear the effects of outsourcing? To answer this question, the present chapter
empirically investigates the impacts of offshore outsourcing of materials and services
on the relative demands for unskilled and skilled workers in the Thailand’s
manufacturing sector from 1999 to 2003.76
In contrast with the manufacturing sector in OECD countries, Thailand’s
manufacturing sector is both a recipient and a source of outsourcing. Both issues have
important implications on the labor market but require different empirical frameworks
to study their impacts on the economy. In this thesis, I will confine my attention
mainly to Thailand’s manufacturing sector as a source of outsourcing. Therefore, the
empirical methodology employed in this chapter lies in the spirit of that applied for
OECD countries.
75 Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), a number of literatures have analyzed the impacts of
outsourcing on labor markets in various economies, such as Anderton and Brenton (1999) for UK,
Geishecker (2002) for Germany, and Hsieh and Woo (2005) for Hong Kong, among others.
76 As discussed later, there are two indexes of outsourcing of my interests: material outsourcing and
service outsourcing. The former follows the broad definition of international outsourcing, the imports
of intermediate inputs as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996). The service outsourcing refers to service
purchases of establishments as in Morrison and Siegel (2001).
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Even though the positive relationship between outsourcing and relative
demand for skilled labor is observed especially in industrialized economies (see
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, Anderton and Brenton, 1999, and Geishecker, 2002,
for example), it may be desirable, at least to us, to investigate whether such a
relationship holds in developing economies.77 In the study by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) on the United States manufacturing sector, the extent of material outsourcing
is given by the share of imports from a particular industry located abroad in total
domestic demand for products in that industry. In their paper, outsourcing is derived
as an import penetration measure. Using the variable cost function with capital as a
fixed input, they concluded that 15 to 33 percent of the increase in the cost share of
non-production workers could be explained by the international outsourcing.
According to their study, the offshore outsourcing of intermediate inputs and the
technological changes is biased towards non-production workers, thus outsourcing
leads to higher non-production workers’ wage share.78
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), a number of studies have been
conducted in various developed economies to empirically investigate the impacts of
outsourcing on the relative demand for skilled workers. Among others, Anderton and
Brenton (1999) employed outsourcing proxied as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996)
distinguishing between intermediate imports from developed and developing
economies based on four-digit ISIC for two UK sectors, textile and non-electrical
machinery sectors. Their results showed that international outsourcing accounts for
roughly 40 percent of the total increase in the wage bill share of skilled workers.
77 Most literatures on the impacts of outsourcing on the relative demand for skilled labor focus on the
dataset collected from industrialized economies. The presence of outsourcing as an explanatory for
widened wage inequalities within industries is consistently confirmed by those literatures.
78 According to Feenstra and Hanson (1999), technological improvement proxied by expenditures on
computers accounts roughly for 35 percent of the rising non-production wage share whereas
outsourcing explains about 15 percent.
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Based on the German manufacturing sector from 1991-2000, Geishecker (2002) find
international outsourcing is indeed an important factor that could explain the decrease
in the relative demand for unskilled workers in Germany. Specifically, by controlling
for skill-biased and capital upgrading effects, international outsourcing is revealed to
explain roughly 24 percent of the decline in the relative demand for unskilled workers
in the German manufacturing sector.
Hsieh and Woo (2005) empirically investigate the impacts of a large
reallocation of unskilled activities to China on skill structure of the Hong Kong labor
market and a sharp decline in the importance of the Hong Kong manufacturing sector.
They find that the extent of outsourcing from Hong Kong to China has entailed strong
and persistent relative demand shifts favoring skilled workers in Hong Kong since the
early 1980s. The evidence reveals that the reallocation of workers from manufacturing
to outsourcing services accounts for roughly 15 percent of the aggregate relative
demand shifts, and the increased utilization of skilled workers within individual
manufacturing industries accounts for roughly 30 percent of the aggregate shift. They
conclude that Hong Kong’s experience is similar to that of the developed countries
highlighting the importance of outsourcing.
This chapter contributes to the rapidly expanding outsourcing literature in a
number of ways. Firstly, this chapter studies the impact of outsourcing on the labor
market by using micro-level data from the Thailand’s manufacturing sector. This is
the first study to explore the impact of outsourcing on the Thailand’s manufacturing
sector. Secondly, unlike the existing literatures, the notion of outsourcing in this
chapter is beyond the standard trade-related material input as service outsourcing may
have equally important impacts on the labor markets. Finally, to the best of my
knowledge, the present chapter is the first to capture the second-order impacts of
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outsourcing on the relative demands for unskilled and skilled labor. That is,
outsourcing may not only shift the relative demands for variable factors but may also
affect them vis-à-vis the substitution effects among all other factors of production.
This chapter adopts a dual approach to investigating the effects of outsourcing
on the relative demands for unskilled and skilled workers in Thailand’s manufacturing
industries by using firm-level data. I formulate a translog cost function in a more
generalized fashion in such a way that there are three variable factors of production:
unskilled workers, skilled workers, and raw materials,79 with both material and service
outsourcing taken into consideration. Thus the notion of outsourcing in this chapter is
beyond the trade in intermediate material inputs. By using Iterative Three-stage Least
Squares (I3SLS) estimation,80 my results reveal that material outsourcing has negative
impacts on the relative demands for both unskilled and skilled workers, whereas
service outsourcing shifts the demands towards skilled workers at the expense of
unskilled ones. Despite this, both types of outsourcing have been shown to be skill-
biased, in the sense that the negative impacts of material outsourcing are more
intensified for unskilled workers, whereas the positive impacts of service outsourcing
are stronger for the skilled, and these more or less account for rising wage inequalities
in the Thailand’s manufacturing sector. Besides the ‘shift’ effects of outsourcing on
labor demands, I also analyze the second-order ‘rotating’ effects or changes in
responsiveness of a particular type of factor demand with respect to factor prices by
estimating the Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution. The results manifest that
79 The existing literatures, such as Anderton and Brenton (1999) and Geishecker (2002), assume that
unskilled and skilled workers are the only variable factors of production. However, this assumption is
too restrictive in the sense that it does not allow for complementarities between unskilled and skilled
workers. Therefore, in this study this assumption is relaxed.
80 As pointed out later in this chapter, there are two main econometric issues inevitably taken into
considerations: invariance of parameter estimates with respect to factor share equations arbitrarily
dropped and endogeneity of the quasi-fixed capital and outsourcing decisions.
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material and service outsourcing play a different role in changing substitutability of
the factor inputs.
The organization of this chapter can be briefly outlined as follows. Section 4.2
is concerned with the overview of outsourcing in the Thailand’s manufacturing sector.
Section 4.3 will enumerate my translog cost function framework, and its extension to
second-order impacts of outsourcing based on the Hicks-Allen elasticities of
substitution. In Section 4.4, data sources and measurements will be discussed, and in
Section 4.5 empirical results will be represented and analyzed. The concluding
remarks are given in section 4.6.
4.2 Offshore Outsourcing in the Thailand’s Manufacturing Sector
Figure 4.1: The Import, Employment, and Manufacturing Indices (2000 = 100)















The manufacturing sector is a key driving force of economic growth in Thailand
economy in terms of both production and GDP contribution. Since the late 1990s, the
Thailand’s manufacturing sector has been characterized by sustained growth as shown
by manufacturing index in Figure 4.1. This expansion can be explained by increases
in both domestic and international demand for its goods.
The recent evidence suggests that the competitiveness of the Thailand’s
manufacturing sector has deteriorated due to increases in the domestic price level and
wages. To sustain their competitiveness in the international market, local
manufacturers have increasingly contracted out their business activities overseas, so
called offshore outsourcing, so as to achieve more efficient operations in their
production. For instance, in the plastic industry the R&D activities are internationally
sourced due to the lack of technology and human capital, and the textile and fashion
industries are outsourcing their marketing and packaging activities to gain more
familiarity with the foreign market.
As do industrialized economies, the prevalence of outsourcing has triggered
concerns of domestic job losses as its impact, at least on local workers’ and public’s
points of view, is tantamount to ‘exporting jobs’. An example can be found in the
conflict between Thai Airways International Public Company Limited and its labor
union (see Bangkok Post, February 11, 2005). The labor union protested against the
outsourcing of new cabin crew to various international agencies to protect 5,200 local
crew staffs.
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Figure 4.2: Material Outsourcing Figure 4.3: Material Outsourcing
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Scatter Plot: Material Outsourcing Vs. Skilled Wage Share
Figure 4.4: Service Outsourcing Figure 4.5: Service Outsourcing
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Scattered Plot: Service Outsourcing Vs. Skilled Wage Share
Figures 4.2-4.5 represent my establishment-level dataset grouped into 62
industries at 4-digit ISIC Rev.3 and averaged across the time horizon of 1999 to
2003.81 I can discern from the Figures that material and service outsourcing affects
the relative demands for unskilled and skilled workers differently. In words, material
81 Both material and service outsourcing indexes in Figures 4.2-4.5 are represented in logarithm forms.
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outsourcing seems to entail a decline in demands for both unskilled and skilled
workers, which may imply that the outsourcing of intermediate inputs is labor-
intensive. In contrast, service outsourcing increases the demand for both unskilled
and skilled workers but it seems to be in favor of skilled workers. From the Figures
above, it is clear that the ‘fear of job losses’ stemming from offshore outsourcing also
exists in developing countries such as Thailand. In this chapter, I will analyze the
impacts of both material and service outsourcing on the relative demand for unskilled
and skilled workers in the manufacturing industries of Thailand.
4.3 The Empirical Model
To empirically investigate the economic impacts of outsourcing on the relative
demands for skilled and unskilled workers, it is important to estimate a cost function
which is sufficiently flexible to show the effects of outsourcing on the firms’ labor
demands. Following Morrison and Siegel (2001), my model is based on a non-
homothetic variable cost function incorporating the quasi-fixed capital and external
shift factors.82 For a given industry i, where i = 1,…,n, the short-run (dual) cost
function can be expressed in an implicit form as:
),,,( ii Tw iii YKGG  (72)
where iw is a vector of variable input prices, including unskilled workers, skilled
workers, and raw materials; iK is the quasi-fixed capital stock; iY is output; and iT is
a vector of external trade and technological factors, including the indexes of
82 Despite those three variable factors, my framework, unlike Morrison and Siegel’s (2001), is based on
the non-homothetic translog cost function rather than the Generalized Leontief cost function.
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outsourcing, and technological progress.83 Therefore, the short-run total cost function
is equal to iKiii KwYKGC  ),,,( ii Tw , where Kw is the market price of capital stock.
Somewhat different from Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), my methodology
is to assess whether the outsourcing variables have significantly affected the shares of
unskilled and skilled workers, and whether these effects are biased towards skilled
workers, thereby resulting in an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers.
Following the approach of Berman, et al. (1994), by assuming that capital is a quasi-
fixed factor, I will employ the non-homothetic translog functional form of a variable
cost function. By assuming symmetry, i.e. jiij   , jiij   , and jiij   , and
temporarily dropping the time and industry subscripts, the cost function is given as:






1lnln 222  
YKKwKwKw YKKMMKHHKLLK ln)(ln2
1lnlnlnlnlnln 2  
2)(ln
2
1lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln YYKYwYwYw YYKYMMYHHYLLY  
OKOwOwOwO KoMMoHHoLLoo lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln  
TwTwTOOY HHTLLTTooYo lnlnlnlnln)(ln2
1lnln 2  
2)(ln
2
1lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln TTOTYTKTw TToTYTKTMMT   (73)
where O is the indexes of outsourcing, and T is the index of technological progress.
For a well defined cost function, it must satisfy the condition of linear homogeneity in
variable factor prices. This implies that I have to impose the following parameter
restrictions on (73).
83 As shown in next section, in the empirical estimation, I will break down the notion of outsourcing
into the indexes representing material and service outsourcing.
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1 MHL  (74A)
0 MjHjLjMMMHMLLMLHLLHMHHHL  (74B)
where ,,, OYKj  and T . With these restrictions, I could estimate the translog cost
function. Nevertheless, gains in estimation efficiency can be obtained by directly
estimating the cost-minimizing variable factor demand equations, which are
represented in terms of cost share equations. By employing Sheppard’s Lemma and
logarithmically differentiating equation (73) with respect to variable input prices, it is
straightforward to show that kkk wCCkwS lnln  , where k = L, H, and M.
Furthermore, the adding-up condition requires that the summation of three factor
shares must be equal to unity ( 1 MHL SSS ), and therefore only two equations
are linearly independent. In light of this, I choose to drop the material share equation
and estimate the followings:
TOYKwwwS LTLoLYLKMMLHHLLLLLL lnlnlnlnlnlnln   (75)
TOYKwwwS HTHoHYHKMHMLHLHHHHH lnlnlnlnlnlnln   (76)
The share equations (75) and (76) can be deemed as a composite
representation of the demands for unskilled and skilled labor respectively. To
estimate these share equations empirically, it is indispensable to specify a stochastic
framework. Typically, a random disturbance term ku is added to each share equation
and assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with the zero mean
vector, 0)( uE , and the variance matrix, )(uVar . Furthermore, my model
specifications also include time-specific ( t ) and industry-specific ( i ) dummies.
These time- and industry-specific effects are meant to capture persistent industrial
differences and overall technological progress affecting the industries. Accordingly,
my fully specified econometric model can be portrayed as follows.
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itLoitLYitLKMitMLHitHLLitLLLLit OYKwwwS lnlnlnlnlnln  
LitititLT uT   ln (77)
itHoitHYitHKMitHMLitHLHitHHHHit OYKwwwS lnlnlnlnlnln  
HitititLT uT   ln (78)
Note that, as thoroughly elaborated in next section, there are two indexes of
outsourcing ( itO ) employed in my empirical investigation, offshore outsourcing of
intermediate materials ( itOM ) and services ( itOS ). Whereas the former aims to
capture international trade in intermediate inputs as in Feenstra and Hanson (1996,
1999), the latter reflects productivity impacts of service outsourcing (see Amiti and
Wei, 2006). Interestingly, the impacts of outsourcing on the relative demand for
skilled workers are two-fold in developing economies. On the one hand, the positive
relationship may be explained by the fact that outsourcing is in fact skill-biased (see
Egger and Egger, 2006) in the sense that outsourcing entails labor productivity
improvements that are biased towards skilled workers. Given the competitive labor
market, outsourcing would shift the relative demand for skilled labor.84 On the other
hand, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Theorem suggests that outsourcing should
be in favor of unskilled labor demand in developing economies, which is well-
endowed in unskilled labor. Specifically, since industries in developing countries, the
Thailand’s manufacturing sector in my case, are well-endowed with unskilled
workers, the standard H-O model predicts that firms will be specialized in unskilled-
intensive production activities and import skilled-intensive intermediate inputs from
developed countries. Given these opposing effects, it might be important to
84 Egger and Egger (2006) investigate the impacts of international outsourcing on the productivity of
low skilled workers. Although they find that international outsourcing improves productivity of low-
skilled labor at least in long run, the productivity impacts are biased towards high-skilled labor and
capital stock, thereby reducing the relative demand for unskilled labor.
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empirically identify the effects of outsourcing on the relative skilled labor demand in
developing economies.
One attractive feature of the non-homothetic translog functional form of dual
cost function (73) is that it does not impose any restrictions on the elasticities of
substitution between two variable inputs a priori (see Berndt, 1991). It may be
interesting to investigate the impacts of outsourcing on substitution among unskilled
labor, skilled labor, and raw materials, as a by product of parameter estimates in the
system of share equations (77) and (78). Apart from the shift effects of outsourcing
on the relative demand for skilled workers as highlighted by the existing literature,
the current chapter, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to empirically investigate
how outsourcing affects the responsiveness of the relative demand for skilled workers
with respect to factor prices. I define this second-order effect of outsourcing as the
“rotating” effects henceforth. The implication of rotating effects of outsourcing on the
relative demand for skilled workers is that the increases in skilled wage inequality
might stem not only from the shift effects of outsourcing, but also from the changes
in the competitiveness of the labor market. If, say, outsourcing is skill-biased and
reduces elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, the impacts of
outsourcing on skilled wage inequality are magnified since the relative wage must
increase considerably in order to eliminate the relative excess demand for skilled
labor. The rotating effects could be determined by the elasticities of substitution
between unskilled and skilled labor. By using parameter estimates from equation (77)
and (78) and the fitted variable factor shares, the Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of








where the i, j = L, H, and M subscripts denote the first and second partial derivatives
of the dual cost function in equation (73) with respect to input price, iw and jw ,
respectively. By using equations (73) and (79), it can be shown that
By differentiating equation (80) with respect to the outsourcing variable, Oln , I can
show that the marginal effects of outsourcing on the elasticities of substitution
between variable factors i and j are:85
Next, I will move into the discussions of the estimation technique for
equations (77) and (78). Although the equation-by-equation OLS estimation might be
appealing since the unskilled and skilled labor shares (77) and (78) are linear in the
parameters, these demand equations are required to satisfy cross-equation symmetry
and linear homogeneity constraints. Even if those constraints are satisfied
asymptotically, equation-by-equation OLS estimates will not reveal such parameter
restrictions. To impose the cross-equation constraints (74A-B), it is inevitable instead
to employ a system of regression equations.
85 Note that the logarithm prevails only in the denominator of (81) in order to be consistent with the
typical specification of biases. See Morrison (1988) for more details regarding the bias specification.
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One possibility is to employ the Zellner’s seemingly unrelated (SUR,
henceforth) estimator (see Zellner, 1962). In my context, SUR is superior to equation-
by-equation OLS estimators for two reasons. First, despite the absence of the cross-
equation constraints, SUR can account for the fact that the disturbances across the
labor share equations are contemporaneously correlated, implying that the covariance
matrix  is non-diagonal. In this sense, equation-by-equation OLS estimates are
inconsistent Second, by taking into account the cross-equation correlations of the
disturbances, SUR estimators are more efficient than equation-by-equation OLS
estimates at least asymptotically.
In general, the SUR estimation is carried out by two steps. In the first step, the
disturbance covariance matrix  is obtained from equation-by-equation OLS
estimations. The Generalized Least Squares (GLS), given the initial estimated 
from the first step, are then applied on the sets of equations. I also perform the
efficient estimation based on the iterative two-step SUR (ISUR) estimation in which
the estimates of  and the Zellner’s procedure are updated and iterated. This
iterative procedure yields efficient estimators that are numerically equivalent to those
of maximum likelihood (ML) estimators.86 This result is particularly advantageous for
my estimation results in the sense that the parameter estimates are invariant to the
choices of share equations arbitrarily dropped due to the adding-up condition. 87
Fortunately, as suggested by Berndt (1991), as long as the ISUR estimation is utilized,
86 See Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974) for a proof of this result.
87 If this invariant property is absent, it would be problematic for my estimation results since one may
choose to drop the share equations that yield the results that are the most consistent with their prior
belief or judgments.
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all parameter estimates and estimated covariance matrix  are invariant to the
choices of factor share equations used in the estimation.88
As argued by Amiti and Wei (2006), there may also be a problem of potential
endogeneity of outsourcing. Intuitively, the decisions to outsource may be affected by
industry-specific factors, such as the exposure to international trade and foreign
ownership. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find the evidence in Mexico that exporters
are more likely to deal with outsourcing activities. Due to the existence of incomplete
contract and unverifiable firm-specific investment, an infant industry should be less
likely to contract out production activities. Moreover, more productive firms may be
self-selected to be engaged in outsourcing activities. Besides outsourcing indexes, the
discussions of my econometric approach enumerated thus far have to do closely with
a short-run cost function in which the capital stock is partially adjusted and therefore
quasi-fixed. As noted by Morrison (1999), the quasi-fixed capital is likely to be
correlated with industry-specific factors, thereby entailing the potential endogeneity
problem in SUR and ISUR estimations.89 To account for this problem, the quasi-fixed
capital ( K ) and the indexes of material (OM ) and service (OS ) outsourcing will be
instrumented by the lagged structural variables (see Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983),
the indexes representing foreign ownership ( FHOLD ) and exposure to international
trade ( EXPORT ). I will relegate the measurement of these IVs to next section. The







(.8601) (.0400) (.2184) (.2502)
88 The invariant property of dropping share equations also holds for SUR estimation provided that the
estimated is estimated by the equation-by-equation OLS estimation without the symmetry conditions
imposed.
89 Amiti and Wei (2006) argue that the endogeneity problem may also exist in outsourcing variables.
Nevertheless, due to the existence of the incomplete contract and firm-specific investment (see
Grossman and Helpman, 2002), they, at least in short run, can be treated as exogenously given.
90 The asterisks ***, **, and * are statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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0635.2 R ***11.4F
The industries with high foreign ownership are characterized by high quasi-
fixed capital and material outsourcing activities, and hence the index of foreign
ownership may be a good IV for quasi-fixed capital and material outsourcing.
Moreover, the results reveal that the industries with high exposure to the international
market tend to have low quasi-fixed capital and service outsourcing. In this sense, the
index of international trade exposure is strongly correlated with quasi-fixed capital
and service outsourcing.
It should also be noted these firm’s characteristics at least in short run should
be exogenous to the firms and strongly correlated to the exposure to outsourcing
activities and capital utilization. Therefore, they satisfy the general requirements of
the instrumental variables. The measurement details will be elaborated in next section.
Given this potential econometric problem, the three-stage least squares (3SLS)
estimation will also violate the invariant property of share equation choices to be
eliminated if the symmetry condition is imposed. To account for both endogeneity
problem and invariant property, the iterative three-stage least squares (I3SLS)
estimation will be employed. Not only does the I3SLS estimation have its asymptotic
consistency, but it can also be shown that my I3SLS is asymptotically efficient if the
instruments satisfy the general requirements of IV estimators.91
91 Schmidt (1976) shows that the 3SLS estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS one asymptotically.
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4.4 Data Measurement
For my empirical estimations, I primarily employ the establishment-level data
retrieved from the reports of the Manufacturing Industry Survey for 1999-2003,92
provided by the National Statistical Office (NSO), Thailand. These datasets contain
basic establishment-level information on manufacturing, such as the number of
establishments; the number of persons engaged; the number of employees; the value
of raw materials, parts, and components purchased; and the value of fixed assets, etc.
In each year, there were approximately 5,000-8,000 establishments engaged in this
survey.
According to the survey, the establishments engaged in manufacturing are
defined as the mechanical or chemical transformation of substances into new products.
The assembly of component parts of manufactured products is also considered as
manufacturing. In this survey, the manufacturing industry activities are classified
according to 4-digit ISIC Rev.3. With establishments as the sampling units, the
survey covered the 62 types of manufacturing activities (4-digit ISIC) in 21 industries
(2-digit ISIC). The description of manufacturing aggregated at 2-digit ISIC is
portrayed in Table 4.1.
One major problem of my datasets is that firms’ identification numbers, due
probably to confidential purposes, were not reported. Therefore, the only way to pool
four datasets for four years altogether is to aggregate them at 4-digit ISIC level,
yielding us 62 manufacturing industries. In the estimation of factor share equations
(77) and (78), 4-digit ISIC industries are classified into three sub-industries according
92 The dataset in 2002 is absent because NSO did not conduct this survey in this year.
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to their technology intensities (see Table 4.2 for details) of low, medium, and high
technology industries.93
Table 4.1: The descriptions of industry classification (ISIC Rev.3)
Industry Description
1 Manufacture of food products and beverages
2 Manufacture of tobacco products
3 Manufacture of textiles
4 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
5 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery,
harness and footwear
6 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
7 Manufacture of paper and paper products
8 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
9 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
10 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
11 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products
12 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
13 Manufacture of basic metals
14 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
15 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
16 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
17 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
18 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
19 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
20 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
21 Manufacture of other transport equipment
22 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
23 Recycling
93 I group the manufacturing industries into three sub-industries, namely low-, medium-, and high-
technology industries. The primary manufactures, such as food, tobacco, textile, and wood product, are
regarded as low-technology industries. In contrast, more sophisticated production, such as chemical,
metal, computer, machinery, electronic product, medical product, and motor vehicle, is classified as
high-technology industries. The rest are defined as medium-technology industries.
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Table 4.2: Technology Level Classification.
Technology Level Industry
Low 1-6
Medium 7-9, 11-12, 22-23
High 10, 13-21
The dataset is constructed by pooling firms across four-digit ISIC level from
1999-2003. The unskilled labor share ( LS ) is proxied by the ratio of the production
worker wage bill to the total production cost (total wage bill plus material cost), and
the skilled labor share ( HS ) is likewise measured by the ratio of non-production
worker wage bill to the total production cost. Except for the price of materials, the
data for unskilled ( Lw ) and skilled ( Hw ) wages (i.e., production and non-production
average wages) can be directly retrieved from the datasets. In addition, the capital
stock ( iK ) is proxied by the value of land, building and construction, and machinery
and equipment at the end of each consecutive year, whereas the total output ( iY ) is
approximated by the sales of goods produced.
Unlike unskilled and skilled wages, my datasets do not report the average
material price ( Mw ). I derived the price index of raw material inputs by making use of
the Annual Input-Output tables retrieved from Office of the National Economic and
Social Development Board (NESDB), together with the annual producer price
indexes at 2-digit ISIC level from Bank of Thailand (BOT).
There are two relevant indexes of offshore outsourcing utilized in my
empirical estimation: material outsourcing ( iOM ) and service outsourcing ( iOS ).
Following Morrison and Siegel (2001), the intensity of service outsourcing is
approximated by the ratio of services purchased to total production cost. According to
my dataset from NSO, there are two types of service purchases reported: cost of
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contract and commission work and cost of repair and maintenance work done by
others. In contrast, the index of material outsourcing is defined in the same fashion as






The index of technological progress ( iT ) is essentially represented by the
intensities of R&D activities (Anderton and Brenton, 1999). As such, this index is
proxied by the ratio of research, planning, and development cost to total expense of
the establishment.
In addition to variables used in the structural system of labor share equations,
I also need to create proxies for instrumental variables (IV) to tackle with the
potential problem of endogeneity. As discussed in the previous section, the quasi-
fixed capital and outsourcing decisions are likely to be endogenously determined by,
in addition to lagged values of structural variables, industry-specific factors, including
the proportions of foreign owned firms and exporters. Classified by four-digit ISIC
manufacturing industries, the proportion of foreign owned firms ( FHOLD ) are
proxied by the number of firms with foreign share holding to the total number of
firms in that industry. Likewise, the proportion of exporters ( EXPORT ) is measured
by the ratio of the number of firms engaged in exporting activities to the total number
of firms in that industry.
94 In Feenstra and Hanson (1996), the index of material outsourcing is measured by combining
production data with the annual input-output table to proxy the imported intermediate inputs. However,
since the imported intermediate inputs can be directly extracted from my datasets, I can employ the
idea of the wide measure of material outsourcing directly.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Impacts of Outsourcing on the Demands for Unskilled and Skilled Workers
In this section, the empirical results from the translog cost function are reported. I
first report the results in Tables 4.3-4.5 based on the full sample of my data.














No. of Obs. 232 232
R-squared 0.3378 0.5608
Chi-squared (p-value) 117.29(0.000)*** 309.67(0.000)***
Correlation of Residual 0.3630
Breusch-Pagan Test (p-value) 30.563(0.000)***
Note: 1) Standard error is in parentheses. 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent. 3) ** statistically
significant at 5 percent. 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent 5) Breusch-Pagan Test is distributed
as the Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom under the null that there is no industry- and
time- specific effects jointly.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 highlights the preliminary results based on SUR and ISUR
estimations. The results from both SUR and ISUR are qualitatively the same. The
Chi-squared statistics reveal that the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly
equal to zero is rejected at 1 % level of statistical significance with R-squared equal
to 0.338 and 0.561 for unskilled and skilled share equations respectively. With the
correlation of residuals between two equations equal to 0.363 and 0.364 for SUR and
ISUR estimations respectively, the Breusch-Pagan Test rejects the null that there are
no industry- and time-specific effects, and therefore the inclusion of industry- and
126
time-specific dummies seems justified.95 According to both estimations, I find the
following interesting results.














No. of Obs. 232 232
R-squared 0.3378 0.5608
Chi-squared (p-value) 118.02(0.000)*** 308.89(0.000)***
Correlation of Residual 0.3643
Breusch-Pagan Test (p-value) 30.784(0.000)***
Note: 1) Standard error is in parentheses. 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent. 3) ** statistically
significant at 5 percent. 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent 5) Breusch-Pagan Test is distributed
as the Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom under the null that there is no industry- and
time- specific effects jointly.
Firstly, both unskilled and skilled workers are substitutes since the coefficient
of Hwln ( Hl ) in the unskilled share equation96 is positive and statistically significant.
Meanwhile, the price of raw materials has a positive impact on the demand for skilled
workers but a negative impact for the demand for unskilled workers.97 Secondly, the
quasi-fixed capital, though statistically insignificant, is positively correlated with
skilled labor, implying that the higher amount of the quasi-fixed capital induces firms
95 I suppress the coefficients of industry- and time-specific dummies in the tables for economizing
space.
96 The linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (74A-B)) imply that the coefficient of
Hwln ( Hl ) in the unskilled share equation must be equal to that of Lwln in the skilled one.
97 Since the dependent variables are the factor shares, I cannot infer whether unskilled and skilled
workers are substitutes for or complementary with material inputs. As shown later, the Hicks-Allen
elasticities of substitution show that material inputs are substitutes for both unskilled and skilled
workers and are skill-biased.
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to shift the relative demand away from unskilled labor to skilled one. Thirdly, the
expansion of output (economies of scale) reduces both unskilled and skilled shares,
thereby raising the raw material share. This may be explained by the presence of
labor market rigidities in the short run. Intuitively, in the short run I could expect the
labor market frictions that may hinder firms to fully adjust workers to meet the
production demands, thereby confining firms to increase the use of material inputs
when production increases. Fourthly, material outsourcing ( OMln ) has a negative
impact on both labor demands with a more significant impact on unskilled workers.98
As shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the estimation results reveal that internationally
sourcing of intermediate inputs results in a decline in both relative demands for
unskilled and skilled workers, which in turn implies positive impacts on the relative
demands for materials. Intuitively, according to standard Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem,
the negative impacts of material outsourcing may suggest that the Thailand’s
manufacturing industries may import labor-intensive intermediate inputs, reducing
the demands for domestically employed labor. In this sense, the estimated coefficients
reveal that the effect of material outsourcing in the Thailand’s manufacturing
industries is analogous to those observed in industrialized countries in terms of
‘exporting jobs’. Moreover, my results indicate that such negative impacts are more
pronounced for unskilled workers due mainly to the imports of unskilled-intensive
intermediate inputs. Fifthly, the effects of service outsourcing ( OSln ) shift the
relative demand for both skilled and unskilled labor. However, the increase in service
outsourcing tends to augment the demand for skilled labor relative to that for the
98 The coefficients of OMln in both equations are negative, but only the former is statistically
significant at 1 percent level.
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unskilled.99 This may suggest that on the one hand contracting out service activities
may enable firms to reap benefits from reallocating labor to core-competent activities,
thereby entailing gains from specialization. On the other hand, service activities, such
as maintenance, call operators, recruitment, etc., in general are unskilled-intensive.
Therefore, outsourcing service activities is more likely to be skill-biased such that an
outward shift in the relative demand for skilled workers is greater than that for
unskilled ones. Lastly, technological progress is labor-augmenting in the sense that
the greater intensities of R&D activities imply the greater relative demands for all
types of workers. 100 It can also be observed that labor-augmenting effects of
technological progress are also skill-biased in the sense that the magnitude of a shift
in the relative demand for skilled workers is more enormous than that for unskilled
ones. Given unchanged physical labor inputs, the labor-augmenting effects of
technological progress entail increases in ‘efficiency units’ of labor, which in turn
shift their relative demands outwards.
To account for a potential endogeneity problem in both SUR and ISUR
estimations, Table 4.5 shows the Iterative Three-stage Least Squares (I3SLS) results
in which the quasi-fixed capital ( Kln ), material outsourcing ( OMln ), and service
outsourcing ( OSln ) are instrumented by the lagged values of structural variables and
industry-specific factors, including the intensities of foreign ownership and exporters.
In light of this, Hausman specification test asserts that the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity problem can be rejected with the 1 percent level of significance (as a
corollary, the parameter estimates under SUR and ISUR are inconsistent).
99 The coefficients of OSln in the unskilled and skilled share equations are positive and statistically
significant at 1 percent level.
100 Although the coefficient of Tln in the skilled share equation is greater than that in unskilled one,
only the latter is statistically significant at 5 percent level.
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No. of Obs. 158 158
R-squared 0.2998 0.5524
Chi-squared (p-value) 110.27(.000)*** 199.68(.000)***
Hausman Test (p-value) 114.49(.000)***
Note: 1) Standard error is in parentheses. 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent. 3) ** statistically
significant at 5 percent. 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent. 5) Kln , OMln and OSln are
RHS endogenous and instrumented by lagged structural variables and industry-specific variables in
logarithm forms, including the ratio of foreign-owned firms to the total number of firms, and the ratio
of exporters to the total number of firms. 6) Hausman Specification Test Statistic is distributed as the
Chi-squared distribution with 24 degree of freedom under the null of no endogeneity problem.
In contrast with the results under SUR and ISUR discussed thus far, the
parameter estimates under I3SLS yield us interesting results. Firstly, the coefficient of
Lwln in unskilled share equation ( Hl ) turns out to be negative and statistically
significant at 5 percent level. This ensures that the estimated translog cost function is
well behaved. Secondly, the extent to which unskilled and skilled workers are
substitutes still holds in I3SLS even accounting for the endogeneity in the estimation.
Thirdly, the new results indicate that material inputs are substitutes for both unskilled
and skilled labor. This suggests that an increase in material prices ( Mwln ) results in
outward shifts of relative demands for both types of labor. Thirdly, the effects of the
quasi-fixed capital on the relative demand for unskilled and skilled workers are
reversed in the sense that it is complementary with unskilled workers but substitutable
for skilled ones. This result is consistent with Helg and Tajoli (2005) who studied the
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labor market effects of international outsourcing, proxied by outward processing trade,
based on Italy and German data during 1990s. They find that capital stock has
negative impacts for demands for skilled workers. Lastly, the impact of service
outsourcing on the relative demand for unskilled workers is negative, though
statistically insignificant. This result strongly supports the fact that service activities
are unskilled-intensive, and therefore firms sourcing those activities at arm’s length
prone to demand less unskilled workers. Meanwhile, gains from specializing in core-
competent activities are reaped by skilled labor, thereby raising their relative demands.
Despite some differences, my main findings concerned with the impacts of
international material outsourcing on the relative demands for unskilled and skilled
workers remain qualitatively unchanged with I3SLS. Specifically, the negative
impacts of material outsourcing on both labor demands are still observed. Therefore,
the fear of job losses in most industrialized economies is also observable for the
developing countries. Furthermore, the fact that technological progress is in terms of
skilled- and unskilled-augmenting effects is still observed, and technological
improvement will augment the physical labor, thereby increasing their efficiency
units and shifting their relative demands. Further, the results from I3SLS reveals that
the factor-augmenting effects of service outsourcing seem more pronounced for
skilled workers.
Interestingly, as shown in Table 4.5, my empirical results are also consistent
with the literature concerned with outsourcing and wage inequality in such a way that
the coefficients of materials ( OMln ) and services ( OSln ) in the skilled share
equation are always greater than those in the unskilled one. Given this, the prevalence
of outsourcing activities will give rise to the widened gap between skilled and
unskilled income. This result is particularly consistent with a number of literatures in
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relation to industrialized economies (see Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, Anderton
and Brenton, 1999, and Geishecker, 2002 among others).
I further divide the data by levels of technology of the industries to analyze
the impacts of outsourcing on the relative demands for unskilled and skilled labor.
Given the possibilities that outsourcing may affect those demands according to
industry-specific characteristics, it may be desirable to carry out the analogous
econometric methodology on an individual industry. Since Hausman specification
test reported in Table 4.5 portrays that the SUR and ISUR results may in fact suffer
from the endogeneity problem and hence results in inconsistent parameter estimates, I
will focus on deriving the results corresponding to I3SLS. In so doing, I will
segregate the Thailand’s manufacturing sector into three sub-sectors based on their
technology levels, i.e., low-, medium-, and high-technology industries. The details of
this classification are shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.6: Iterative Three-stage Least Squares (I3SLS) Estimates by Thailand’s Manufacturing industries, 1999-2003.
Independent Var.













Lwln 0.0073(.009) 0.0302(.014)** -0.0239(.013)* 0.0133(.014) -0.0217(.01)*** 0.0103(.007)
Hwln 0.0303(.014)** 0.0463(.053) 0.0133(.014) -0.124(.030)*** 0.0102(.007) -0.0332(.019)*
Mwln -0.0376(.02)** -0.0765(.065) 0.0107(.019) 0.1107(.036)*** 0.0114(.008) 0.0229(.022)
Kln 0.0278(.008)*** 0.0978(.031)*** 0.0227(.014) 0.0256(.026) -0.0072(.008) -0.0313(.023)
Yln -0.0309(.01)*** -0.114(.033)*** -0.038(.014)*** -0.0430(.025)* 0.0067(.009) 0.0152(.026)
OMln 0.0640(.026)** 0.2206(.102)** -0.0162(.020) -0.0212(.040) -0.0421(.021)** -0.0153(.062)
OSln 0.0150(.011) 0.0689(.042)* 0.0051(.013) 0.0646(.026)** 0.0170(.005)*** 0.0601(.016)***
Tln 0.0078(.003)** 0.0191(.013) 0.0088(.003)*** 0.0047(.006) 0.0015(.001) 0.0073(.004)**
Constant 0.0302(.123) 0.6344(.461) 0.5222(.165)*** 1.6009(.329)*** 0.1465(.040)*** 0.8892(.115)***
No. of Obs. 31 31 51 51 76 76
R-squared 0.2023 0.2593 0.4549 0.5663 0.4648 0.6337




Note: 1) Standard error is in parentheses. 2) * statistically significant at 10 percent. 3) ** statistically significant at 5 percent. 4) *** statistically significant at 1 percent. 5)
Kln , OMln and OSln are RHS endogenous and instrumented by the lagged structural variables and industry-specific variables in logarithm forms, including the ratio of
foreign-owned firms to the total number of firms, and the ratio of exporters to the total number of firms. 6) Hausman Specification Test Statistic is distributed as the Chi-
squared distribution with 20 degree of freedom under the null of no endogeneity problem.
133
As shown in Table 4.6, when the overall manufacturing industries are
disaggregated according to their skill intensities, the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity problem cannot be rejected except for unskilled-intensive industries.
Essentially, the main findings from Table 4.6 can be summarized as follows. First,
unskilled and skilled workers are substitutes for all industries, and the degree of their
substitution seems to be the strongest in low technology industries. Second, material
inputs are substitutes for workers employed only in medium and high technology
industries whereas an increase in material prices will cause a decrease in the relative
demands for those employed in low technology industries.101 Third, the quasi-fixed
capital ( Kln ) seems to be complementary with those employed in low technology
industries. In addition, albeit statistically insignificant, my results show that capital
and labor are complementary in medium technology industries but are substitutes in
high technology industries. Fourth, short-run rigidities of labor and capital
adjustments may account for the fact that expansion of final output production
requires higher relative demands for material inputs, in turn entailing a significant
decline in the relative demands for unskilled and skilled labor. These negative
impacts of output expansions ( Yln ) prevail only in low and medium technology
industries. In high technology industries, the impacts of output expansion on the
relative demands for both types of labor, though statistically insignificant, are positive.
Fifth, the separation of the manufacturing sector into three sub-sectors implies that
labor employed in different industries may be affected differently by material
outsourcing. More specifically, the results that material outsourcing ( OMln ) leads to
a decline in the relative demands for unskilled and skilled workers prevail solely in
101 As portrayed in Table 4.6, in low technology industries, the effects of Mwln are significant only for
the unskilled share; in medium technology industries, merely skilled workers are significantly affected
by material prices; and, neither unskilled nor skilled shares is significantly affected in high technology
industries.
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medium and high technology industries. However, a statistically significant and
positive relationship between material outsourcing and the relative labor demands
does characterize low technology industries. Intuitively, these may be interpreted as
the fact that manufactures in medium and high technology industries internationally
source labor-intensive intermediate inputs, while those in low technology industries
may choose to contract out capital-intensive ones. Sixth, with regard to the impacts of
service outsourcing ( OSln ) on the relative labor demands, I find that, unlike those of
SUR and ISUR, service outsourcing entails a positive effects on the relative demands
for both unskilled and skilled workers, and the effects are particularly significant in
high technology industries. It is also noteworthy that, as explained earlier, service
outsourcing is skill-biased since service activities contracted out are in general
unskilled-intensive, and therefore the positive impacts on skilled labor demand are
more pronounced. Lastly, my results of labor-augmenting technological progress
( Tln ) are rather robust in the sense that it does shift the demands for both types of
labor outwards across all sub-sectors as their productivity, in terms of efficiency units,
increases.
Furthermore, with regard to the role of outsourcing as an explanatory for
rising wage inequality, increases in material and service outsourcing can enlarge the
wage differential across skilled groups in low technology and high technology
industries. In other words, since the coefficients of OMln and OSln are greater in the
skilled share equation in those industries, material and service outsourcing is skill-
biased and thus brings about larger wage inequalities. Nevertheless, I can only
observe such effects for service outsourcing in medium technology industries.
4.5.2 Impacts of Outsourcing on Factors Substitution
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As elaborated in Section 4.3, my next step is to utilize the estimation results from the
previous sub-section to study the impacts of outsourcing on (variable) factors
substitution as proxied by their Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution. To
figure out elasticities of substitution, I employ parameter estimates based on I3SLS so
as to account for invariance of parameter estimates with respect to the share equation
dropped and the potential endogeneity problem, and all calculations are evaluated at
the fitted means of factor shares.
By using parameter estimates of I3SLS in Table 4.5, the Hicks-Allen



































As shown in (83), the diagonal elements, representing own price elasticities,
are all negative, which implies that the translog cost function estimated is well
behaved. Furthermore, it can also be seen that the demand for unskilled labor is the
most elastic, and thus they are the most vulnerable to a change in their wages. In
contrast, raw materials are the least sensitive to changes in their prices. The off-
diagonal elements in (83) portray the elasticities of substitution between two variable
factors. Apparently, all variable factors, unskilled labor, skilled labor, and raw
materials are substitutes.
Next, I calculate the marginal effects of material and service outsourcing by
using (81). The impacts of material outsourcing on substitutions among variable












































As shown in (84), material outsourcing increases the own price elasticities of
the unskilled and skilled labor demands in the sense that when firms become more
specialized in some particular core-competent activities, the existing workers are
prone to be more vulnerable to changes in their own returns.102 This suggests that the
notion of material outsourcing not only shifts the relative demands for unskilled and
skilled workers, but also increases the responsiveness of their demands. Intuitively, as
material outsourcing opportunities become more feasible, firms’ labor demands are
more responsive to changes in their wages. Unlike those of unskilled and skilled
workers, the elasticities of raw materials seem to be negatively correlated with
material outsourcing; that is, when firms decide to internationally source intermediate
inputs, the demands for raw material become more inelastic. This may be explained
by the fact that material outsourcing requires firms to customize their raw materials
used to be perfectly compatible with intermediate inputs produced at arm’s length,
thereby making them less sensitive to their price changes.
Regarding the substitution between variable factors of production, material
outsourcing tends to have a positive impacts on the substitution between unskilled
and skilled workers and between unskilled and raw materials, but negative, though
negligible, impacts on the substitution between skilled workers and raw materials.
This suggests that material outsourcing makes unskilled workers more substitutable
by skilled workers and raw materials, but the substitutions between skilled workers
and raw materials are reduced.
Likewise, the impacts of service outsourcing on substitution among variable
factors of production are given in (85).













































According to (85), service outsourcing makes the demands for unskilled and
raw materials more elastic and those for skilled workers less elastic. This may provide
clearer insights on the skill-biased effect of service outsourcing in the sense that
Thailand’s manufactures contracting out service activities, which are by definition
less skill-intensive, and therefore become more specialized in more skill-intensive
activities performed in-house. The fact that the remaining production activities
become more skilled-intensive is also characterized by more elastic demands for
unskilled workers and raw materials and less elastic demands for skilled workers.
Unlike material outsourcing, service outsourcing identically brings about
lower elasticities of substitution among all factors of production. A decline in
substitutability of factors of production may stem from the fact that service
outsourcing, as discussed earlier, enables the remaining factors of production to be
more specialized in core-competent activities, thereby reducing their substitutability.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I employ a non-homothetic translog function to empirically
investigate the impacts of outsourcing on the demands for unskilled and skilled labor
in the Thailand’s manufacturing sector during 1999-2003.
My empirical results reveal that material outsourcing has negative impacts on
the relative demands for unskilled and skilled workers and is skill-biased. Explained
by the standard H-O Theorem, Thailand’s manufacturing industries in general may
outsource labor-intensive intermediate inputs, thereby reducing their relative demands
domestically. My results support the observation of job losses due to ‘exporting jobs’
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effect of material outsourcing in developing countries as observed in most
industrialized economies. Moreover, service outsourcing is also found to have
negative impacts on unskilled workers and positive impacts on skilled workers. This
can be explained by the fact that service activities are in general unskilled-intensive
and the decisions to contract out those activities will undermine the relative demand
for unskilled workers, whereas gains from specialization can be reaped by skilled
workers employed in house. Like material outsourcing, service outsourcing is
therefore skill-biased. By combining these effects of material and service outsourcing,
I can also infer that the skill bias of outsourcing could explain the rising wage
inequality within industries.
I also extend my empirical results to uncover the impacts of outsourcing on
own-price and cross-price elasticities of substitution among variable factors of
production by calculating Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution. Evaluated at
fitted values of factor shares, my results indicate that unskilled labor, skilled labor,
and raw materials are substitutes. I find that material outsourcing makes both skilled
and unskilled labor more susceptible to changes in their own wages whereas it results
in more inelastic demands for raw materials. Besides, it makes unskilled labor more
substitutable by skilled labor and raw materials but reduces the substitution between
skilled labor and materials. In contrast, service outsourcing is found to entail more
elastic demands for unskilled labor and raw materials and more inelastic demand for
skilled workers. Unlike material outsourcing, service outsourcing reduces
substitutability among all variable factors of production.
My results shed further light on the impacts of outsourcing on the labor
market in the Thailand’s manufacturing sector. The results show that outsourcing
decisions by local manufacturers may not be always undesirable for domestic workers,
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depending on their types. In the case of Thailand, material outsourcing is found to
have a negative impact on domestic employment, whereas the service outsourcing,
though skill-biased, may be beneficial for domestic workers. Thus, in designing labor
market policies for developing countries, it is important for policymakers to
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